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THE RELATION BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION

Anita L. Hauenstein

A Dissertation

Submitted to

The Graduate Faculty of

Auburn University

in Partial Fulfillment of the

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August 14, 2000

THE RELATION BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION:

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION

Anita Louise Hauenstein

Certificate of Approval:

Elizabeth W. Brazelton
Associate Professor
Counseling and
Counseling Psychology

Mark A. Kunkel, Chair
Associate Professor
Counseling and
Counseling Psychology

Becky J. Liddle
Associate Professor
Counseling and
Counseling Psychology

John F. Pritchett
Dean
Graduate School

VITA

Anita Louise Hauenstein, daughter of William Richard and Margaret Anne Maynard Hauenstein, was born March 22, 1960, in Atlanta, Georgia. She graduated from the Lovett School with honors in 1978. She attended Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee, from 1978-1982 and graduated cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology and Religion. She attended Vanderbilt Divinity School from 1982-1987 and received a Master of Divinity degree in May, 1987. She was ordained as a minister in the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. in January, 1989 and has served several churches as a Presbyterian clergy person. In 1993, she returned to graduate school at Auburn University. She received a Master of Education degree in Community Agency Counseling in December, 1995. In September of 1995, she entered the doctoral program at Auburn in Counseling Psychology.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

THE RELATION BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION:

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION

Anita Hauenstein

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The relation between the fields of psychology and religion is viewed in various ways. Understanding the relation between the two has implications for both theory and practice. This study focuses on exploring the relation between these two disciplines through a kind of ethnographic "eavesdropping" on the conversation taking place in academic and popular literature (in both fields of study) and in informal, academic interchanges on e-mail discussion groups. Historical perspectives on this issue are also examined. What emerges is a 12-fold typology or continuum of perspectives on this issue, ranging from antagonistic positions to more harmonious viewpoints. Each of the 12 categories is delineated, described, and depicted visually. A theoretical elaboration based on ego-identity and faith development theories is offered as one way of understanding the various perspectives.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to suggest a comprehensive model for understanding the relation between religion and psychology. This model will be based and elaborated on available samples of dialogue speaking to this relation, sources which include published, professional articles and books, professional discussion lists via email, and some popular portrayals. The suggested model will be inclusive of historical and contemporary thought on the subject and will address current issues as well as implications for future research, practice, and theory.

Description of the Problem

For the last one hundred years, as psychology has worked to distinguish itself from other disciplines as a scientific, professional, and academic field, there has been no shortage of opinions, positions, and papers on the nature of the relation between psychology and religion. Indeed, some of the earliest psychological theorists and practitioners, such as William James, Sigmund Freud, and Carl Jung, had much to say about the nature of religion as it relates to the psychological functioning of the individual. Since then, other voices in the field of psychology have added new and sometimes radically divergent insights into the conversation.

As a result, there are many different voices, viewpoints, and attitudes in the

conversation between religion and psychology and in the assessment of one by the other. There have been few efforts to bring all of these voices into a coherent, inclusive conversation to create some order out of the chaos. Some such efforts will be discussed in the pages that follow, but the goal of the present study is to address what often seems like a confused cacophony of positions and to integrate them into one, coherent whole. Such a unifying and inclusive model holds the promise not only of helping to clarify some of the existing thought on the subject but also of providing a common way of thinking and speaking about various approaches to and understandings of the relation between psychology and religion.

Significance of the Problem

The problem – how to make sense of the relation between religion and psychology -- is manifested in the literature in both practical and conceptual ways. It is hoped that providing a comprehensive model of the relation between psychology and religion will benefit theory and practice in ways that will be suggested throughout the dissertation. The review of literature that follows is intended to identify possible areas of context for theoretical elaboration of our results that will be presented in later chapters. The literature review is the basis for a theoretical elaboration that is intended to provide a thorough and comprehensive model allowing practical and conceptual perspectives on the relation between religion and psychology to be located within the framework provided.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

This literature review is specific to psychology as the prototypical science of interest and to Christianity as the religion of interest, for the most part. This was a methodological decision as well as a phenomenological discovery that emerged during the process of reviewing the available literature and evaluating the resulting data. It was not our intent at the outset of this study to confine the review so narrowly. Nevertheless, the meaning of the terms "science" and "religion" throughout this review refer primarily to psychology and to Christianity respectively.

Practical Considerations

It is clear in the existing literature that the relation between religion and psychology is not simply an abstract, intellectual issue that is debated by academicians and theorists who are interested in each of these two areas. In fact, there are many concrete, clinical considerations that raise this very question for clinicians, students, and academicians. As professionals and psychologists-in-training are confronted with these practical situations, it would be helpful to have a framework to help in understanding the issues and in articulating informed and ethical responses.

Worthington, Kurusu, McCullough, and Sandage (1996) suggest that, "Counselors -- religious and nonreligious -- must learn to evaluate and recognize

biases and competencies, so they can treat some religious clients effectively, refer religious clients whom they cannot treat effectively, and know the difference" (p. 470). Implied in this assertion is the acknowledgment that clinicians must be aware not only of the client's system of beliefs but also of their own convictions and assumptions and the possible effects that these individual variables may have with regard to evaluation, treatment, and referral. I will begin by examining religious convictions of clients and practitioners as an individual, clinical variable before reviewing how these individual variables may, in turn, influence assessment, treatment, and intervention.

Religious Orientation

Worthington, et al. (1996) underscore the salience of religious issues in the practice of counseling and psychology with the assertion that,

> Religious experience is not only part of multiculturalism but also consistent with the overall direction of postmodern culture. The acceptance of some role of religion in counseling has thus exploded into the mainstream of counseling and clinical psychology over the last decade. (p. 448)

The importance of accepting "some role of religion" in the practice of psychology is also an aspirational goal outlined in Principle D of the American Psychological Association's Code of Ethics:

> Psychologists are aware of cultural, individual, and role differences, including those due to age, gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and socioeconomic status. Psychologists try to

> eliminate the effect on their work of biases based on those factors, and they do not knowingly participate in or condone unfair discriminatory practices. (1992)

These acknowledgments suggest a responsibility on the part of clinicians to remain aware of religious variables and to consider how religious issues are to be acknowledged, understood, and addressed in the psychotherapeutic process.

With regard to the religious orientation of clients, various surveys, polls from 1944 to 1992, and research reports indicate that a large percentage of the population of the United States defines itself in relation to religious values, beliefs, and practices. Larson, Pattison, Blazer, Omran, and Kaplan (1986) point out that,

> Over the last 10 years, national surveys have documented the substantial religious orientation of the population of the United States. More than 90% of those polled believe in God, more than 40% attend religious services weekly or more often, and more than 20% perceive religion to be very important in their lives (p. 329).

In 1985, for example, 9 in 10 Americans said they pray to God and 56% asserted that religion is very important in their lives, with 30% stating that it is fairly important (Religion in America, 1985). A 1992 Gallup Organization survey estimated the religious preferences of Americans "as 56% Protestant, 26% Catholic, 2% Jewish, 7% other; and 9% no preference" (Hoge, 1996, p.25). Therefore, fully 91% of the Americans surveyed claimed some kind of religious preference. Clients who present themselves to psychologists and mental health professionals for help will often hold, to some degree, a view of themselves and of the world that is informed and influenced by religious ideas, values, and practices. Thus, as Worthington, et al. (1996) and the client demographics

cited previously suggest, religion is a cultural variable with which practitioners must contend in order to understand the worldview and the presenting concerns of the client.

With regard to cultural variables, ethnicity has also been shown to relate to varying degrees with religious values. For example, African Americans often value spirituality and demonstrate a strong religious orientation, while Asian and Pacific Island Americans have been shown to value certain qualities associated with Confucianism, such as pacifism and self-control (APA Commission on Violence and Youth, 1993). It has also been suggested that as people continue to immigrate to the United States, religious diversity will likely increase accordingly, for example, augmenting the number of Catholics in the United States as most recent immigrants are Catholics (Hoge, 1996). And, as Worthington (1989) suggests,

> Few counselors today would attempt to counsel a client from an ethnic minority group without assessing the impact of the client's culture on the client's functioning....
>
> Religious identity is often as strongly influential as either racial or cultural identity. In many instances, ethnic and religious identity are intertwined. (p. 588)

An example of this might be Lovinger's (1996) observation that many African Americans will approach clergy for counseling rather than go to an agency, counselor, or psychotherapist. He further suggests that the African American individuals who do seek help from therapists may conceptualize their problems and present them in a religious manner that requires careful and respectful handling on the part of the therapist.

Apparently, African Americans are not alone in their tendency to seek help first from the clergy. Various studies from 1960 to 1988 indicate that anywhere between 34 to 42 percent of Americans who are seeking help for personal problems turn to the clergy as their primary resource (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1960; Larson, Hohmann, Kessler, Meador, Boyd, & McSherry, 1988; Veroff, Kulka, & Douvain, 1981). A religious orientation, sense of identity, and view of the world therefore seems fairly common in both the general and the help-seeking population in the United States.

With regard to counselor or therapist religious orientation, there are some therapists who consider themselves to be religious, just as there are also practitioners who present themselves as Christian counselors and psychotherapists (Johnson & Ridley, 1992). Others are simultaneously ministers and mental health professionals who seek some sort of union of the two perspectives within the therapeutic process (Mattson, 1994). In addition, there are treatment settings that identify themselves as Christian psychiatric hospitals and Christian therapy units (Vande Kemp, 1996) in which professionals offer therapeutic services. The existence and orientation of such individuals and institutions seems to beg the question of how some have integrated two different disciplines in their practice and what this means for each discipline.

In fact, some of the literature that informs clinical practice includes psychological journals that address specifically religious issues (such as The Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, The Journal of Psychology and Theology, and The Journal of Psychology and Judaism). Certain assumptions about religion and the role it plays in relation to psychology are reflected in the content and methodology of the various

journals and articles relevant to the subject. Finally, some psychologists have chosen to be members of organizations such as the American Psychological Association's Division 36 (The Psychology of Religion), suggesting an interest in or an affiliation with religious issues in psychology.

And yet, for the most part, mental health professionals as a whole claim to be less conventionally religious than the general population (Bergin, 1991; Bergin & Jensen, 1990; Weaver, Samford, Kline, Lucas, Larson, & Koenig, 1997; Worthington, 1989). For example, Bergin and Jensen (1990) surveyed clinical psychologists, marriage and family therapists, social workers, and psychiatrists for the purpose of assessing therapists' religious preferences, values and orientations. Bergin and Jensen (1990) note that, "...psychologists and therapists (as a group) are particularly set apart by standards that are informed by a scientific Weltanschauung, a humanistic orientation, and a liberal political outlook" (p. 3). The results of their survey confirm previous findings suggesting that psychologists claim low rates of conventional religious affiliation and participation. Bergin and Jensen indicate, however, that there appears to be a substantial amount of religious participation and spiritual involvement by therapists over and above traditional practices and beliefs. They refer to this interest in matters of a spiritual nature as "spiritual humanism" and suggest that it may help to serve as a bridge between "a secular profession and a more religious public" (1990, p. 3). After all, the authors suggest, "every therapeutic relationship is a cross-cultural experience" (p. 3) in which the therapist is challenged with understanding the client's worldview and presenting concerns.

Lovinger (1996) points out that, "Almost all therapists have had some exposure to

religion" (p. 354). As a result of their experience, therapists often bring different convictions about religion to the therapeutic process. Gorsuch (1988) even goes so far as to suggest, "Psychologists generally have strong pro- or antireligious convictions, which they bring with them to their investigations and interpretations" (p. 218). Whatever the convictions of the attending therapist, it is possible that the therapeutic lens may refract, even distort, the client's material in various ways, such as through countertransference, value clashes, or a failure to understand the client's worldview through a misunderstanding of the client's cultural or denominational context and the resulting assumptions (Lovinger, 1996). It would seem, therefore, that therapist assumptions about religion and its relation to psychology and to psychological well-being inevitably inform the process of evaluation, treatment, and intervention.

With this acknowledgment that there are often individual, cultural, and ethnically influenced variables to consider in evaluating a client's presenting issues, it is important to consider what the literature has to say about the current state of diagnosis and assessment and its relevance to the relation between psychology and religion. These topics will be addressed more specifically in the results and discussion that follow in this document.

Diagnosis and Assessment

A new section of the DSM-IV (V62.89) called "Religious or Spiritual Problem" serves as an indication that psychologists are aware that clients may bring religious or spiritual issues and understandings into the therapeutic context. This acknowledgment suggests a responsibility on the part of clinicians to articulate how religious issues are to

be acknowledged, understood, and addressed in the process of diagnosis and assessment.

Religious issues are therefore now "officially" among the diagnostic criteria a clinician uses as a lens to understand the client's presenting problem. For example, in assessing and diagnosing a client who presents with depression related to a diagnosis of HIV or AIDS, (especially in the southern United States where the church plays a major role in shaping cultural values and norms) religious values and messages may or may not play a part in both the depression and the resolution of the depression. As Lovinger (1996) points out, "Clinical assessment is important in the conduct of therapy because it leads to significant treatment decisions affecting both strategy and tactics" (p. 346).

Religious identity may therefore be an aspect of the client's self-understanding and worldview, as indicated in the previous section on cultural considerations. As an example, a client who presents with the tendency to speak in tongues may identify with a religious tradition (such as the Pentecostal tradition where glossolalia is common) that encourages the practice and may not see it as problematic (Lovinger, 1996). It is quite a different matter if the client presents with glossolalia and does not come from a religious or cultural context that encourages the practice. Therefore, if we accept that clients often understand religion to play a part in their self-definition, in their presenting problems, and perhaps even in their expectations for help and healing, then this raises the question of whether or not psychologists are prepared to respond to the religious content of clients' presenting concerns.

This aspect of assessment necessitates an awareness of one's own view of religion as a clinician and how it relates to psychological health and well-being and to the

therapeutic process. It would therefore be helpful to examine how various approaches to understanding religion and religious issues might influence clinical judgments with regard to referral practices, interventions, informed consent and the like. This, too, will be more fully elaborated in the chapters that follow.

Referral and Collaboration

Some suggest that referral to local clergy is appropriate when counselor competency or comfort level is in question (Gorsuch & Meylink, 1988; Meylink & Gorsuch, 1986; Tjeltveit, 1986). The literature reveals, however, that there are few, if any, referrals made to clergy by mental health professionals (Lowe, 1986; Meylink & Gorsuch, 1988; Mollica, Streets, Boscarino, & Redlich, 1986). For example, one practitioner has written somewhat unapologetically, "In over 12 years of full-time practice, I have never made a referral to a member of the clergy, regardless of the patient's religious orientation or the problems that were presented" (Hendlin, 1989, p. 619).

Others suggest that collaboration with local clergy has been demonstrated as successful and as one way in which interdisciplinary dialogue and education may benefit both disciplines (McMinn, Chaddock, Edwards, Lim, & Campbell, 1998; Meylink & Gorsuch, 1986; Weaver, et al., 1997; Young & Griffith, 1989). At the same time, Gorsuch & Meylink (1988) point out that "Psychologist variables concerning interaction with other co-professionals, specifically clergy, have yet to be studied" (p.30). Although research is now being conducted on variables related to interaction between the two professions, much remains to be understood about the biases, assumptions, and practices

of both clergy and psychologists.

It would further our self-understanding as professionals to know what referral and collaborative practices are currently taking place in the field and which practices are proving to be effective in bringing about change and healing. It would also benefit our thinking to understand what assumptions, biases, and understandings inform the decision to refer or to collaborate.

Still others suggest that in this age of managed care,

> As changes in health delivery systems make long-term psychotherapy less available in traditional fee-for-service settings, religious communities may well be faced with new challenges in mental health care. Ideally, religious communities and psychologists will collaborate to enhance personality change and adjustment among parishioners with chronic mental health needs. (McMinn, et al., 1998, p. 565)

It would be helpful not only to have further information about referral practices, collaboration and consultation among religious and mental health professionals, but, in keeping with the present study, it would be helpful to be able to outline what we do know about current practices and to attempt to infer and organize assumptions that may undergird different responses to religious issues in psychotherapy and different approaches to the conversation between religion and psychology. My intent in this project was to provide an organizational, comprehensive framework for tying these current practices and the underlying assumptions that inform them together.

Training

Many suggest that counselors and psychotherapists have not been trained adequately in thinking about religious issues, much less in considering their own positions, biases, and levels of comfort in addressing such issues (Bergin, 1991; Hawkins & Bullock, 1995; Hinterkopf, 1994; Miller, 1992; Shafranske, 1996). In fact, religion and religious beliefs are rarely addressed in psychology textbooks (Jones, 1994). One ongoing question for students, academicians, and professionals in psychology, then, is what type of training, if any, is sufficient to equip therapists and counselors to address religious issues in a therapeutic context or even to prepare them to discern when to refer and whether and how to collaborate with religious professionals.

Conceptual Issues

On a more conceptual and theoretical level, how is it possible that psychology is openly embracing and including religion and religious issues in clinical settings, publications, training sites, and organizations? What assumptions would inform such an inclusive approach to religion and religious considerations? How might we as psychologists understand the differences and the similarities between the disciplines that allow us to converse and to intersect all the while working to understand and to maintain our distinctions? Is such conversation and intersection unwarranted, inadvisable, and unhealthy? Ward (1995) has suggested, for example, "Considerable effort was exerted in the development of psychology to distinguish it from its philosophical and pre-scientific beginnings, and the field has progressed as a result" (p. 543). Are these organizations, publications, degree programs, and various efforts at integration all potentially, as Ward

(1995) suggests, "a reactionary threat to scientific objectivity" (p. 543)?

Answers to such questions are informed (ideally) by our understanding of the relation between the psychological and the religious realms. It would therefore be helpful to consider how theorists have understood the relation between these two disciplines historically and how contemporary theorists and clinicians make sense of the relation now. Although there is a preliminary categorization of three positions, these are intended to inform and in no way constrain our final categorization either in breadth or depth. An overview of various positions follows, with a more detailed set of categories and positions to be covered by the model proposed herein.

On a theoretical level, debate, confusion, and divergent opinions on the relation between psychology and religion have prevailed in the literature since the origin of psychology as a discipline. Since the earliest days of psychology's history, religion has gained the attention of some of psychology's most prominent theorists and contributors to the field, such as Wilhelm Wundt, William James, Sigmund Freud, and Carl Jung. Contemporary theorists and clinicians, such as B.F. Skinner, Heinz Kohut, Albert Ellis, and others have added their voices and opinions to the conversation, lending even more complexity to an already diverse discussion. In addition, from another vantage point, theologians, clergy, and academicians engaged in the study of religious issues have debated, discussed, and delineated various positions on the issue as well.

How might we meaningfully categorize, compare, and contrast the often dissonant and divergent views of the relation between religion and psychology found in the literature? In the following section, I will review approaches to understanding the

conceptual relation between psychology and religion that are currently represented in the literature. In this initial overview, I will summarize the various perspectives from a very general and broad analysis of the representation of the relation between the two disciplines. As an organizational method of analyzing existing viewpoints on the subject at hand, this review will examine the perspectives of those who view religion and psychology as incompatible, as distinct but "bridgeable," and as essentially compatible. It should be noted from the outset that the positions represented in this section are not discreet and orthogonal but do, in fact, overlap and intersect in various ways. They are also preliminary in nature as is this three-fold method of organizing the positions. At present, this three-fold template is therefore preliminary and tentative and is based on my best guess about how to organize the review of literature. These assumptions, indeed this typology, will be suspended intentionally throughout the later work in an effort to approach the data from an unbiased perspective. A more detailed and reliable delineation of positions will therefore be described in the final analysis. In addition, as a preliminary strategy for locating various perspectives in the different categories mentioned above, I will describe each tradition according to the following dimensions: ontological assumptions (convictions about the nature of reality, including assumptions about ultimate realities) and epistemological convictions (assumptions about the origin, nature, and limits of knowledge and appropriate methods of discovering such knowledge).

Psychology and Religion as Incompatible

Historically, in its efforts to distinguish itself from philosophy and religion and to establish itself as a scientific field of study, psychology has highlighted its differences

from religion. Positivists, such as Auguste Comte and much later B.F. Skinner, along with Francis Bacon, and the British Empiricists, for example, have asserted that anything that cannot be observed empirically is outside the purview of the scientific method and, is, consequently, an inappropriate subject for scientific examination. From these epistemological convictions, then, flow related assumptions about what we can know, how we may study and add to what we know (methodologically), and about the boundaries of psychology as a science.

Those who fall into this category or way of thinking about psychology and religion may therefore assume certain ontological and epistemological convictions. For example, it may be assumed that there is or is not an ultimate, external reality. Science-practitioners, for example, may be entirely focused on what we can observe, convinced that all we can know is founded on observable phenomena. The epistemic methods of this group, then, would include the traditional methods of science – observation, experimentation, theory building and hypothesis testing. By contrast, theologians who are convinced of the existence of an ultimate, external reality may value other pathways to knowledge or truth, such as revelation, insight, meditation, and prayer. Those who fall into the "incompatible" category are focused on their particular methods of discovery. Each may see no reason or value in the overlap of the two disciplines.

An illustrative example of the ontological and epistemological convictions of this group might be the work of Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt, often regarded as the founder of psychology, was a student of the German physiologist, Hermann Helmholtz, who asserted that all knowledge depends on sensory experience (Marx & Cronan-Hillix, 1987)

and who looked, with his students, for physiological explanations wherever possible. Although Wundt turned his attention to an analysis of mental processes and was in many ways a phenomenologist, he continued to affirm that controlled observation and experimental conditions are an indispensable element of scientific examination in the pursuit of advances in psychology and knowledge in general. In one of his lectures, for example, Wilhelm Wundt stated that,

> It is experiment, then, that has been the source of the decided advance in natural science, and brought about such revolutions in our scientific views. Let us now apply experiment to the science of the mind. We must remember that in every department of investigation the experimental method takes on an especial form, according to the nature of the facts investigated. In psychology we find that only those mental phenomena which are directly accessible to physical influences can be made the subject matter of experiment. (Wundt, 1977, p. 10)

Wundt, therefore, accepted that assumptions of science (natural causality and the universality of natural law) serve as a primary lens through which to view immediate experience.

> Wundt believed...that all sciences which embrace normal outer and inner experiences as the only source of knowledge agree that the natural order is the exclusive realm of science, and that in explaining it, one may not use ideas which belong to the realm of belief or appeal to the supernatural. (Marshall & Wendt, 1980, p. 166)

Wundt suggested that the study of religion is outside the purview of experimental

psychology and might be more appropriately examined from what he called the ethnographic and historical approach of "Folk Psychology" (Wulff, 1997). In his work about this type of psychology (1928), Wundt asserts that, "Gods are personal beings, whose characters reflect the peculiarity of the people who created them" (p. 363), perhaps sounding very much like yet another student of Helmholtz's, Sigmund Freud.

Around 1900, at least two of Freud's followers, James Putnam and Oskar Pfister, tried to reconcile the Christian religion with Freud's psychoanalytic theory and approach (Wulff, 1997). Needless to say, they were not successful, in large part due to Freud's passionate assessment of religion as an illusion, as a "universal neurosis" (Freud, 1961) and his characterization of religious ideas, not as products of personal experience, but as "illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest, and most urgent wishes of mankind" (Freud, 1961, p. 30).

Gay (1989) describes Freud's work, The Future of an Illusion, as "Freud's most sustained psychoanalytic assault on religion" (p.xliv). Religion, as Freud represents it in this work, is a vivid illustration of how knowledge is influenced by unconscious forces (e.g., wishes, fears, and desires). According to Freud, religious ideas are illusions based on infantile wishes. So, for Freud, religion is not only antagonistic to psychological health and maturity, it is also a neurotic refusal to see the world as it really is. What Freud suggests instead of religion is science. Wulff (1997) describes Freud's position with clarity and boldness when he states, "Science, not intuition, he says, is the only way we may come to know the reality outside ourselves. What science and reason cannot tell us -- and the gaps are many -- we will have to do without" (p. 285).

Freud is not alone in his insistence that religious ideas are psychologically unhealthy or immature and that religion has no place in the science of psychology. Albert Ellis (1960) once wrote, "...I am inclined to reverse Voltaire's famous dictum and to say that, from a mental health standpoint, if there were a God it would be necessary to uninvent Him" (p. 191). He went on to explain his position by stating that, "The concept of sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbance. The sooner psychotherapists forthrightly begin to attack it the better their patients will be" (1961, p. 192). According to the Ellis of the 1960's, religious notions of sin and guilt are irrational and pathological and only lead to an unproductive focus on the "sinful" behavior, rather than to effective and rational changes in behavior.

> Ellis makes his position on religious convictions clear when he states,
>
> I do not, as a psychologist and a member in good standing of the American Sociological Society and the American Anthropological Association, believe that we can have any absolute, final, or God-given standards of morals or ethics. (1960, p. 189)

Rather, Ellis insists that psychological health and wholeness emanate from reason and a life lived in relation to rational principles. Within such a system of convictions, it is therefore irrational to believe and to live as though God exists (as this is not scientifically and rationally verifiable). In fact, religious ideas and behaviors serve as indicators of pathology and emotional disturbance (Ellis, 1980; Quackenbos, Privette, & Klentz, 1986). Thus, for Ellis, it seems that psychology and religion are not only incompatible but that the role of psychology is to eradicate religious beliefs and behaviors.

A contemporary example of the position that psychology and religion are incompatible would be Ward's (1995) assertion that,

> It is essential to psychology's integrity as a science to maintain a firm grasp on what constitutes valid scientific reasoning. Considerable effort was exerted in the development of psychology to distinguish it from its philosophical and pre-scientific beginnings, and the field progressed as a result (p. 543).

Ward contrasts religious belief with psychological knowledge and truth by pointing to empirical testing and observation as psychology's distinguishing feature as a scientific enterprise. He refers to Jones' (1994) suggestion that there is room for dialogue between the two disciplines as "a reactionary threat to scientific objectivity" (p. 543). Needless to say, Ward, along with many others, chooses to pitch his tent in the camp with the original empiricists.

From another vantage point, there are those in the religious arena who share the above convictions, namely, that religion and psychology are essentially incompatible. One view from this perspective is that psychology as science is an invalid and inaccurate enterprise, in part because it appeals to a different "authority" (e.g., to observation and the scientific method, rather than to Scripture, tradition, revelation and so forth). When religious theologians and practitioners deny the validity of science in this way, Wilber (1998) suggests that, "This is a typically fundamentalist retort to modernity, and is itself a by-product of modernity" (p. 16). Wilber adds that,

> ...with the rise of modernity and its inherent claim that all religions are childish productions, many fundamentalist religions (especially Christianity and Islam)

> began to deny even the basic facts of science itself: evolution does not exist, the Earth was literally created in six days, radiocarbon dating is a fraud, and so on. (p. 16)

Wilber's suggestion then, is that as science began to challenge some of the claims of religion, one response from religious communities was to shut the door against science altogether, thus perhaps throwing psychology and other potentially useful enterprises out with the proverbial bath water.

It is difficult to find evidence of this posture toward psychology in contemporary, academic literature. A review of religious publications as well as attention paid to some contemporary stories of people of (Christian) faith, however, offers some evidence of the view within the religious community that religion and science are incompatible. For example, Roberts (1994), in the name of helping perplexed Christians make sense of "psychobabble" in this age of many forms of therapy, warns the ecclesial community against allowing psychological values and goals to replace Christian ideals. Roberts warns that psychological ways of thinking and speaking may replace Christian methods of understanding the self and relationships (implying that the two ways of making sense of personal and relational variables are distinct and perhaps mutually exclusive systems of meaning and value). Roberts (1994) asserts that,

> These therapeutic virtues are often similar to the Christian virtues, and this is perhaps one reason Christians are attracted to the psychologies and feel comfortable with them. But the therapeutic virtues are not only similar to the

> Christian ones; they are also, in important ways, quite different from them -- even incompatible with them. (p.23)

Roberts proceeds to draw contrasts between the basic need or drive as postulated by theorists such as Freud with the core need or potential of Christianity, which, he suggests, is the commandment to love God and to love neighbor as oneself (Matthew 22:37-40). He also highlights the importance of sin, personal responsibility, and contrition as essential to Christian self-understanding and therapeutic enterprises. He suggests that much can be learned from the myriad of therapeutic styles, theories, and orientations, but he concludes again with a warning to the Christian community. He declares that, "...first and foremost, Christian psychology must be true to the complexity of human nature and to the distinctive biblical view of the self" (1994, p. 24). (emphasis added)

Other examples of the incompatibility of science and psychology from a religious perspective can be found in articles that review current religious beliefs about psychology and the attitudes and practices among those who consider themselves religious. For example, in an interview (Maudlin, 1998) with Steve Arterburn, cofounder of New Life Clinics (the largest Christian provider of both psychiatric and psychological services -- inpatient and outpatient), it is suggested that the evangelical invitation to Christian conversion often implies that once a person accepts Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior, all problems (e.g., depression, mental illness, addictions) will go away. Several examples of messages that have been preached from pulpits and espoused by evangelical Christian pastors are excerpted from conversations with pastors and offered as illustrations of the evangelical position in relation to psychology. One such example is captured in the

words of a pastor who asked to talk with Arterburn. He is quoted as saying, "I used to preach against you and against psychology. And I sure preached against anybody taking medication. Then I ended up with a depression so debilitating I could not get out of bed. I languished there for about a month" (p. 32). When his wife convinced this pastor to seek help, just as the church board was threatening to fire him, this pastor went to see a "Christian psychiatrist" who gave him medication. He said, "Now the thing that I used to preach against is the thing that has set me free to preach" (1998, p. 32). In spite of this pastor's change of heart, there are other examples offered in this interview and countless other stories located in contemporary experience that indicate that many pastors, congregations, and Christian organizations continue to "preach against" psychology and against the advisability of medication for those who may be struggling with depression and mental illness.

Arterburn describes a more extreme example of this posture toward science and psychology in what he identifies as the most dramatic horror story in the area in which he lives. He tells the story of a young man who had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and who was released from a mental institution at the age of sixteen. As Arterburn describes it, this young man was taking large amounts of psychotropic medication. The young man worked in a local church, carrying out small tasks and doing odd jobs, even doing some occasional babysitting. The church was accepting of the young man, and after about a year of attending the church, the young man declared his faith. According to Arterburn, the pastor of the church told the young man that since he was a new creature in Christ, he no longer needed medication. The young man stopped

taking medication. The local newspaper interviewed him from a jail cell after he had apparently murdered a little girl (Maudlin, 1998).

The assumption underlying these and similar stories appears to be that the claims of science and of religion are essentially incompatible. More specifically, it seems that such a position rests on the stance that science (psychology in this instance) does not understand or acknowledge the power of religion to change lives and solve problems and that religion does not need the scientific method to understand the nature of the world and its surroundings. Even Arterburn, who is described as a contemporary apologist for psychology among Christian evangelicals, is quoted as saying that,

> Over the past 15 years Christians have begun to take psychology back. You've got more marriage and family counselors coming out of Christian colleges than you do from secular colleges. They have a biblical spiritual foundation, which is only right because real psychology is biblical. (Maudlin, 1998, p. 31). (emphasis added)

Implicit in such a statement is the suggestion that psychology as it has evolved into a discipline is incompatible with (the evangelical Christian) religion unless it is grounded in biblical principles.

Perhaps from a more theoretical and purely theological position than that of the interview cited above, Tjeltveit (1989) appears to argue the point made by Ward (1995). Tjeltveit seems to agree with Ward's assertion that psychology is distinct from theology in that it is committed to the value of objectivity, the scientific method, and the study of human behavior and experience. By contrast, Tjeltveit asserts that religion (from what he

describes as his Lutheran Christian perspective) claims epistemological convictions and a focus far different from those of psychology. Namely, he suggests that theology is concerned with the study and knowledge of God, rather than with the study and knowledge of human beings, which, he declares, is the purview of psychology. Tjeltveit (1989) suggests that as theology focuses on God, it is dedicated to serving as an "integrational discipline" (p. 208) which considers all knowledge and sources of information and truth about "reality," whereas psychology remains more exclusively focused on human behavior, thinking, and experience. Tjeltveit does not go so far as to say that these two areas of inquiry have nothing to contribute to one another, but he does declare that, from a theological perspective, a so-called psychology of the Christian religion is impossible, given his conviction that religious understanding cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of psychology.

Finally, like Tjeltveit, Browning (1992) draws a very clear and firm distinction between psychology and religion even as he outlines what psychology has to offer the church and what the church has to offer psychology. In the end, however, Browning (1992), who purports to write from a liberal and main-line perspective, declares,

> Although I have advanced several ways in which psychology can serve the Church, the reader will notice that in the end I believe that these modern psychologies have little to contribute that our Jewish and Christian traditions do not possess already. On the whole, they help us differentiate, refine, balance, and perceive more deeply the resources that we already have. (p. 135)

For Browning, then, psychology may augment understanding of natural law theories and

the "nature" in human nature, as he puts it, but it does not provide the most helpful lens through which to see humans and the world, as does the Judao-Christian tradition, to use his terminology.

These are but a few examples of the position that psychology and religion are incompatible enterprises from the perspective of theorists from both disciplines. These and related perspectives will constitute the data from which we will attempt to assemble and interpret a representative body of perspectives on this conversation. We will also, in the process, elaborate and extend our criteria, and perhaps have occasion to reconsider the notion of compatibility as an organizing construct once criteria for the different perspectives (on the relation between religion and psychology) are delineated and made more explicit.

By contrast, many view the two disciplines as being admittedly different and distinct but as offering value to one another across a bridgeable divide.

Religion and Psychology as Distinct but "Bridgeable"

Some in the field of psychology view psychology and religion as distinct but not incompatible. Ontological and epistemological convictions of this group may include commitments to different assumptions about reality and, consequently, to different methods of pursuing and discovering more about that reality, and yet, at the same time, a value may be placed on dialogue between enterprises.

For example, some psychologists suggest that, although religion and psychology are separate and distinct enterprises, there is potential value in conversation between the two disciplines. Jones (1994) is one psychologist who makes such claims, suggesting

that,

> Despite their many differences, scientific and religious attempts at understanding are both exercises of human rationality that are shaped by our preorienting assumptions, are accountable to human experience, are influenced by the human communities of which we are a part, and are attempting to understand aspects of our experienced realities. They are different, but there is not an unbridgeable chasm between the two. (p. 190)

Jones (1994) highlights the distinctions between the science of psychology and religion, with his suggestion that science typically focuses on "the more sensory, objective, public, quantifiable, and repeatable aspects of experience," (p.188) while religion usually examines "the more internal, subjective, qualitative, and unmeasurable aspects of human experience and with the nature of the transcendent through revelation, reason, and human experience" (p. 188). Thus, although the scientific enterprise uses a certain methodology involving observation, and the development of hypotheses, laws, and theories in its efforts at sense-making, and religion uses other explanatory methods and mechanisms (e.g., the use of metaphor, narrative, and reason), Jones suggests that, not only are there commonalities between the two enterprises, but there are also a number of potentially fruitful ways to bridge the differences. Jones (1994) offers some possible bridges between the enterprises, the nature of which are beyond the scope of this section. Various connections between religion and psychology will, however, be reviewed and suggested in the work that follows.

Jones (1994) does, however, make some bold assertions that should be noted here.

He suggests that the science of psychology has tended towards a unilateral view of religion (e.g., in courses such as the psychology of religion). What Jones offers, instead, is a more dialogical relation between the disciplines in which each will be shaped and influenced by the other. He asserts that, "A willingness to establish such a dialogical relationship with religion will necessarily presume the willingness of scientists and professionals to become theologically and philosophically literate and for theologians and philosophers to become scientifically and professionally literate" (1994, p. 195). In contrast to the psychological theorists named in the previous section, Jones does not view such dialogue and interaction as a "reactionary threat to scientific objectivity" (Ward, 1995) but as a strengthening of the explanatory power of each enterprise. Jones (1995) continues to assert, against the objections of many in the field, that there is no rigid demarcation between science and metaphysics, or religion, and, indeed, that a dialogue would benefit both disciplines.

Cox (1995) also argues for the viability and the importance of the interface between psychology and religion and pushes Jones's position on the subject even a little bit further. Cox outlines the difference between science, with its use of an objective method of observation and experimentation, and religion, with its more subjective and experiential methodology. He goes a step farther than Jones, however, when he suggests that,

> Scientists and religionists need to talk meaningfully with each other. Even more important, the scientific and religious dimensions need to communicate freely within the individual scientist and religionist by offering both critique and

> constructive insight....The religionist must be willing to incorporate new scientific understanding into a flexible religious philosophy. The scientist must give up a narrow scientism to the enlarging perspective of spiritual reality. (1995, p. 541)

Cox therefore suggests that, although psychology and religion may employ two very different methods of sense making, using distinct sources of data and information about the areas of study, there *should be* a constant dialogue and interplay between the two for each enterprise to be relevant and meaningful. He suggests boldly that this dialogue should take place, not only between the two disciplines, as Jones suggests, but also within each profession and professional. The implications of such a possibility will be addressed in the model that follows.

Echoing this view from a more pastoral and theological perspective, Oates (1978) depicts psychology and religion as drawing upon two different reservoirs, often to the same end. Oates suggests that physicians and psychotherapists (as scientists) and the clergy are faced day in and day out with human suffering. He further suggests that both share a common commitment to help in the healing process and in the alleviation of human suffering, bringing their expertise from different areas of study to bear on the suffering at hand. Speaking to the issue of interaction between scientists and clergy, Oates (1978) has this to say:

> The minister who takes the intentions of God seriously cannot skirt, ignore, or consider out of his or her realm of interest all known means of understanding the human person in sickness and in health. The more seriously he or she takes the

> human person in sickness and in health, the more common ground there is for the medical doctor and the minister to meet in dialogue. The ideal way of learning for both is in conjoint education in the same clinics, hospitals, prisons, etc. Then artificial distinctions of separate territories, roles, and power bases dissolve in the sweaty struggle in behalf of the best interests of the patient. The substantive data of each other's disciplines represent different angles of vision for perceiving the care and cure of persons as human bodies. Human suffering's demands overflow the banks of neatly separated roles. (p. 3)

Oates continues with the assertion that a physician's or psychotherapist's knowledge of a client's religious culture and concerns can only aid in the provision of effective diagnosis and treatment, as, similarly, a clergyperson's knowledge of the inner workings of the human body and the human mind can only aid in helping to provide intelligent ministry to the individual. With Jones (1995; 1994) and Cox (1995), Oates therefore suggests that although the primary area of expertise in each field may be distinct, there would be a great benefit (to the client as well as to the professional) resulting from interaction and dialogue between the two bodies of knowledge.

An interesting, if controversial, example of the belief that psychology and religion are different enterprises that, in conversation, may benefit one another, is offered by McLean (1999) who reviews contemporary perspectives on the distinction between mental illness and demonic possession. McLean points out that, for the first time in four hundred years, the Vatican has updated its manual on exorcism. The manual offers instruction on casting out evil spirits associated with demonic possession and cautions

exorcists to be careful lest they confuse mental illness with spiritual possession. As McLean illustrates, the Reverend Tom Maxwell is a priest who, for 40 years, has worked in the field of exorcism. He has evidently taught clergy about exorcism and has performed exorcisms himself. While psychiatrists and psychologists are sharply divided on the concept of exorcism, the Rev. Mr. Maxwell is quoted as saying, "Neither psychiatry nor theology should minister alone. Healing is always on more than one level – the emotional, the spiritual, sometimes the physical" (p. 31). Maxwell suggests that once the exorcism has been performed, the person needs to receive follow-up care from both pastoral and psychological caregivers.

Other examples of this characterization of the relation between religion and psychology – as distinct but bridgeable enterprises – will be explored and further delineated in the model and consequent discussion. Meanwhile, a final overarching perspective on the relation between these two arenas of theory and practice might be characterized by a vision of religion and psychology as "compatible" enterprises.

Religion and Psychology as Compatible

The positions noted in the previous section all hint at the possibility that these two areas of interest may work together to enhance one another and to achieve their own separate and combined goals. Some psychologists and theologians, however, take this implication a step further by asserting that psychology and religion are and should be part of the same enterprise.

The ontological assumptions of those who believe that psychology and religion are compatible may include a conviction about or an openness to the existence of an

ultimate, external reality that includes an epistemic dimension that is not accessed completely by scientific methods or by theological methods exclusively. Other ontological assumptions may include the inherent nature of the spiritual impulse in human experience and the psychological (and spiritual) value of fulfilling that aim and integrating the religious dimension within oneself. With regard to epistemological assumptions, those who fall into this category may value different pathways to truth and embrace different sources of truth and methods of accessing such truth in pursuit of a larger perspective than either the scientific or religious enterprise may offer alone. Those who adhere to such a position may posit the unity of all knowledge, thereby embracing different methodologies as representing different paths up the same mountain. The uniqueness of this position, as contrasted with those who believe in a dialogical relation between psychology and religion, may lie in the conviction that there is value in combining the two disciplines in some fashion.

An example of this position might be that of William James (1985), one of the first psychological theorists, who describes religion as "an essential organ of our life, performing a function that no other portion of our nature can so successfully fulfill" (p. 52). He further suggests that:

> To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right and superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities. (1985, p. 189)

James' view appears to suggest that our personal experience is a valuable source of information about ourselves and about the universe and that religion has some inherent value for humanity and for healthy psychological functioning. By contrast, as suggested earlier, Freud (an idealist) seems to suggest that personal experience is not to be trusted because we filter all experience through our own personal wishes. For Freud, then, religion might thus be characterized as a kind of cultural neurosis resulting from the infantile wishes of humanity and offering no real value to psychology or to humanity, except, perhaps, in furthering our understanding of the power of wishes and of defenses against aggressive impulses.

As contrasted with those in the "incompatible" camp, James was open to knowledge from an array of sources (such as observation, introspection, and experience). The underlying conviction here must be that there are valuable lessons to be learned through different methods and from different sources. For James, then, religious inspiration is yet another source of knowledge that may contribute to overall knowledge.

James was also concerned primarily with the adaptive and functional value of knowledge, whatever its source. As Fowler (1996) points out with regard to James:

> His commitment to pragmatism allowed him to reshape the question of the "truth" of religious experiences, practices, and beliefs. Instead of addressing questions of truth epistemologically, metaphysically, or theologically, his analysis consistently sought to appraise the veridical character of religious experience by assessing its impact on the intensity of human action and on the shaping of human welfare. (p. 166)

Thus, for James, the salient criterion for addressing the value of religious insight and experience is a pragmatic one. How, for example, does it add meaning, passion, hope, and integrity to the human enterprise?

Criticisms of this stance and of similarly inclusive positions highlight the confusion sometimes generated by a blurring of the differences between the two enterprises and their different aims, claims, and methods. Fuller (1994) sums up this criticism well when he suggests that, "In a thinker as wide-ranging, penetrating, and iconoclastic as James, there is an inevitable blurring of the usual boundaries between disciplines" (p. 2). This is uncomfortable territory for some psychologists and some religionists, yet it is precisely in this territory that the present project is located.

Many contemporary psychologists also underscore the value of religious insight and experience. Some are even calling for a rapprochement between or an integration of psychology and religion (Bergin, 1980; Hinterkopf, 1994; Mattson, 1994; Miller, 1992; Quackenbos, Privette, & Klentz, 1986; Richards & Bergin, 1997; Richards & Potts, 1995; Shafranske & Gorsuch, 1984; Shafranske & Malony, 1996; Stander, Piercy, Mackinnon, & Helmeke, 1994; Weaver, Samford, Kline, Lucas, Larson, & Koenig, 1997).

One example of a more contemporary position is that of Shafranske and Malony (1996), who assert that several factors, such as the professional aspiration of being culturally inclusive, the cultural reality and pervasiveness of religion, and the variable of religion in mental health, necessitate psychology's inclusion of religion and religious variables in the clinical practice of psychology. They further address the "nexus where psychology and religion intersect" (p. 574) and declare that the question for psychology is

not whether religion should be included in psychological theory and treatment, but rather how it should be included. Shafranske and Malony build their case for the inclusion of religion in psychology and delineate possible methods of carrying out this integration. They sum up their position with the statement:

> We conclude that religion in all of its varied expressions and nuances be included in the clinical practice of psychology. This requires a commitment within the profession to mount a sustained effort to better understand the influence of religious involvement on psychological functioning, mental health, and psychological treatment. (p. 582)

Bergin's (1991) examination of religiosity and wellness is an example of one person's effort to elucidate and further delineate some of the effects of religiosity on mental health and psychological functioning. Many studies that research one aspect of the relation between religion and psychology have been cited throughout this proposal. We believe, however, that at the present time, an appropriate pathway toward further understanding and perhaps even integration of these two areas must rely not on the study of such microvariables, but on an overall analysis of the broad range of possible relations between religion and psychology. This overall model of understanding is what we propose to offer in the succeeding chapters of this dissertation. Before concluding this section, however, it is necessary to acknowledge some of those in the religious field of study who are also seeking a compatible relation between religion and psychology.

Curran (1960) suggests that intellectual insight alone is not enough to effect change. He asserts, along with Rank (1936), that people change because they acquire a

whole new view of themselves in the therapeutic context (in the therapeutic experience of feeling and willing). It is here, Curran suggests, that an ancient Judeo-Greek-Christian value system may be of help in the therapeutic process. Curran adds that,

> Certainly...more intelligent cooperation and mutual understanding and respect must develop between the clergy and the psychological and psychiatric professions. Serious thought must be given too, to those factors which cause this distorted view of sin and guilt to be prevalent and the degree to which this gravely affects mental illness. (p. 194)

Curran proceeds to suggest that the experience of sin and guilt alerts individuals to psychological and spiritual issues. Thus, Curran suggests that even such spiritual issues must be examined along with consequent and related psychological concomitants. He concludes:

> Looked at in this way, it would seem that, however desirable it might or might not be, we cannot separate feelings of guilt and sin from the whole psychological process of personal and social reasoned responsibility. To do otherwise would only weaken the person psychologically. (p.195)

Similarly, Fowler (1996) also writes primarily from a theological perspective, but speaks of the overlap between religion and psychology. Fowler suggests that clinicians may view "the faith dimension as an essential feature of human experience that complements other lines of development" (p.165).

Fowler defines faith in the following way:

> Faith...may be characterized as an integral, centering process, underlying the formation of the beliefs, values, and meanings, that (a) gives coherence and direction to people's lives; (b) links them in shared trusts and loyalties with others; (c) grounds their personal stance and communal loyalties in a sense of relatedness to a larger frame of reference; and (d) enables them to face and deal with the limit conditions of human life, relying on that which has the quality of ultimacy in their lives. (p. 168)

Faith, then, as previously defined, may include a variety of faith orientations from religious faith to more secular beliefs and value orientations. Fowler distinguishes religion from faith by suggesting that the former may be a cumulative tradition, composed of various beliefs and practices (which influence faith), whereas the latter is the more personal and existential experience of orienting convictions, values, and beliefs.

Fowler describes the stages of faith development as he understands them and weaves in various psychological correlates and understandings of each stage. He takes particular care in examining the similarities and differences between James' (1985) ideas and those expressed in faith development theory. Fowler (1996) concludes by asserting that:

> In these reflections I am simply trying to say that we work in relations where faith – your faith, the help seeker's faith, and the third body of shared trusts and loyalties that both constitute the relation and emerge in importance as it proceeds – is present and a vital factor in healing. The triadic shape of this relationship needs to be acknowledged, honored, and cared for. (p. 185)

Research Objectives

The intent of the present project was to provide a preliminary and concise model speaking to the relation between psychology and religion. The preceding categories were based on inspection of examples of religious and psychological perspectives and attempts to evaluate them and locate them in reliable categories (compatible, bridgeable, incompatible). This categorization is not final, however, and the intention of the document that follows is to document and elaborate the model that resulted from a more comprehensive compilation and review of data from both religious and psychological sources, the analysis of these data, the grouping of meaning units into categories and the writing of a theoretical portrayal of the data.

In conclusion, it is important to evaluate the resulting model with regard to widely acknowledged and established criteria for adequacy. These criteria include standards such as importance of the model, precision and clarity, parsimony and simplicity, comprehensiveness, operationality, empirical validity, fruitfulness, and practicality (Bordons & Abbott, 1999). An evaluation of the model's strengths and limitations will therefore be offered in the conclusion section of the dissertation.

In the results and discussion chapters of this dissertation, I will present the outcome of the compilation of illustrated meaning units and the categorization of these meaning units into reliable and helpful groupings, and I will provide a theoretical and conceptually focused portrayal of categories. It is hoped that the resulting model will help to elaborate, clarify, and explain existing ways of making sense of the relation between religion and psychology.

As evidenced by the review of the literature offered in this dissertation, the question about the relation between religion and psychology is currently being raised in a myriad of ways both in practice and in theory. This dissertation seeks to provide a much-needed unifying portrayal of the many positions on the subject. This, in turn, provides a new way of envisioning and speaking about the relation between religion and psychology.

I have selected an ethnographic approach to data gathering, using grounded theory to organize statements or meaning units. I have chosen an ethnographic approach because ethnography is "...open, phenomenologically oriented, reflexive and free of predetermined hypotheses" (Toren, 1996). Ethnography emphasizes living in a social context so as to become privy to the symbols, transactions, and cultural artifacts that reside in the context of interest. As a method of data gathering and participant observation that is both naturalistic and phenomenological, an ethnographic approach seemed an appropriate way to eavesdrop on the conversation that has occurred and continues to occur around the subject of this study. In addition, much of the research in this area to date has been guided by a predetermined set of assumptions. There is therefore an evident need for pretheoretical, discovery-oriented (Mahrer, 1989) approaches to this topic. By approaching the topic in this way, I hope not only to eavesdrop on the discussion that is taking place, but also to add something meaningful and helpful to the conversation.

CHAPTER THREE

Method

Traditional methodological approaches typically describe participants as subjects participating in experiments, completing surveys, or providing interview responses. By comparison, grounded theory researchers (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967) often broaden the definition of research participants to include those who (a) experience the phenomenon under investigation (b) report on the phenomenon and (c) attempt to understand it. Thus, participants in this study fulfilling these respective roles included (a) psychiatrists, psychologists and other mental health professionals and academicians as well as pastors, theologians, and other religionists; (b) authors of books, journal articles, and other written works relevant to the phenomenon under study; and (b) the dissertation author and advisor. The author is an ordained (Presbyterian Church USA) clergy person and also a graduate student in counseling psychology under the direction of a professor who is familiar with issues related to religion and psychology by virtue of his professional preparation in psychology and his service for two years as a full-time Christian missionary.

Participants

As the founders of the grounded theory methodology have suggested, "When someone stands in the library stacks, he is, metaphorically, surrounded by voices begging to be heard" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.163). The primary participants in this study

therefore consist of psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, and mental health clinicians as well as pastors, theologians, and "believers" who have voiced their opinions on the subject under study by articulating their positions in some written work including books, journal articles, interviews, and email discussion groups. In a very real way then, I am approaching these data as if I am eavesdropping surreptitiously on the conversation occurring professionally from both religious and psychological viewpoints concerning the relation between these two camps. The metaphor of conversation and dialogue was helpful for me as I attempted to identify various voices in the chorus and to amplify them in a way that allowed them to be more clearly differentiated from one another.

The primary researcher for this study was a 40-year-old author under the direction of the dissertation chair, a 42-year-old male professor. Some (e.g., Strauss & Corbin, 1998) have suggested that researchers should be well studied in the topic under investigation. I have been actively involved in religious studies for more than 22 years and have been an ordained Presbyterian minister for more than 11 years. Similarly, I have studied psychology for more than 10 years and have been a graduate student in a counseling psychology (masters and doctoral) program for 7 years. To the extent that this training and experience has increased my familiarity with the phenomenon under study and my appreciation for the perspectives of both religionists and psychologists, an understanding of these participants' positions is enhanced. Where possible, the approach to data collection and analysis was guided by my attempts to hear and include a spectrum of the positions voiced on the subject under study.

Procedure

It must be noted that, with any grounded theory methodology, it is difficult to distinguish "Method," "Results," and "Discussion" as distinct and discrete sections, as the development of grounded theory is a cyclical process in which theory emerges from the data and the process of collecting, examining, comparing, and making sense of the data. As Bogdan and Biklen (1992) have observed, "You are not putting together a puzzle whose picture you already know. You are constructing a picture that takes shape as you collect and examine the parts" (p. 32). Therefore, many of the procedures in this chapter are illustrated by examples from the results. Although the procedural steps are enumerated in this chapter, a more thorough description of findings will follow in the ensuing chapter.

I employed the methods of grounded theory analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) in this study. The procedures of grounded theory are intended to provide a representational theory or model of participants' experience (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such a theoretical model is grounded in participants' verbatim accounts. The process of analysis is both cumulative and cyclical, as it involves repeating sequences of analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The approach to data collection was initially atheoretical, in that an attempt was made to suspend a priori assumptions (such as the three-fold typology invoked in the literature review) with regard to how the data might be schematized. This process of bracketing (Husserl, 1977/1925) permitted participant experience to remain in the foreground and the categories and their properties to emerge from the data.

The source of conversational data for this study included both popular and professional literature, written by clinicians and academicians from both religious and psychological fields of study. Initially I read widely from psychological literature past and present, with an eye toward notable psychologists who spoke directly to the phenomenon under investigation. Gradually, I began to read more particularly in current books, journals and publications. Both researchers helped to keep one another aware of recent relevant publications even up until the final stages of this research study.

I made a concerted effort to read from a wide body of literature to ensure a fairly diverse and rich sampling of perspectives on the phenomenon under study. It should be noted, however, that, while listening deeply and empathically to a wide range of voices was a primary objective of this project, concerns such as random sampling, generalizability, and purposeful targeting of data sources, as understood from the perspective of more traditional methodologies, were not. In other words, whereas quantitative methods are typically more concerned with random sampling in order to ensure the representativeness of the sample, in keeping with qualitative, ethnographic methodologies, the objective in this study was not to attempt to include the entire spectrum of voices on this subject, but rather to develop an adequate and accurate understanding of the voices included in this study. Criteria for the selection of voices will be articulated in the ensuing pages.

Similarly generalizability, as it is traditionally understood, was not a primary objective in this study. Researchers Strauss and Corbin (1998) outline the objective of qualitative methodologies as follows:

> To continue with our illustrations of how the usual canons for judging the merit of good science might be redefined to fit qualitative research designs, consider the canon of generalizability. The purpose of using a theory-building methodology is to build theory. Thus, we are talking more the language of explanatory power rather than that of generalizability...the real merit of a substantive theory lies in its ability to speak specifically for the populations from which it was derived and to apply back to them. (p. 267)

Finally, as mentioned above, purposeful targeting of particular voices was not part of the overall intent of this study. As Anselm and Strauss point out,

> Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory....The initial decisions are not based on a preconceived theoretical framework. (p. 45)

Therefore, the ethnographic methodology employed in this study represents an effort to listen deeply to some of the voices speaking to the question of interest, and, in turn, to allow further listening to be guided by emerging theory.

I considered data from a wide range of sources including various church publications, articles and discussion groups found via the Internet, professional and academic journals, and both classic and contemporary books addressing the subject at hand. The process of data gathering, as mentioned above, was guided not so much by a clearly delineated attempt to capture certain perspectives, but by a desire to hear a

diversity of positions and perspectives on the subject under study. Data collection was, however, informed by a very comprehensive literature search on the constructs of interest and by ongoing attention to conversation about the relation between the two areas of interest from a vast array of sources.

Through a lengthy and collaborative process of data collection and analysis, certain "voices" were selected, quoted, and recorded for further data analysis. Quotes were selected based on a number of criteria including elegance (concise, efficient, and straightforward nature of the statement), relevance (to the underlying research question), interest (to us and, it is hoped, to others), variety (spread and diversity of various points of view) and balance (of psychological and religious perspectives). Quotes that did not meet these criteria were discarded and eliminated from further consideration or inclusion.

In keeping with the naturalistic approach of ethnographic researchers, I attempted to eavesdrop on this conversation in a way that did not contribute to it or interfere with it but that nevertheless allowed me to become familiar with the topics of interest and with some of the mechanisms by which these debates occurred – how they were framed, the venues in which they took place, and so forth. As Rachel (1996) points out,

> The underlying assumption of the ethnographic method is that the world is essentially a social business, produced through the interactions of people as they go about their life in an everyday, mundane way. In order to find out how a particular community operates, one must invest an extensive period of time...living with them: being physically, verbally and emotionally present, moving among their interactions, joining in their discourses....This is the character of ethnographic work. (p. 114)

Or, as depicted by Bordens and Abbott (1999), "Like an investigative reporter or undercover police officer, you insinuate yourself within a group and study the social structures and interaction patterns of that group from within" (p. 159). And so, as one engaged in ethnographic eavesdropping, I listened to and moved among the voices available to me in the sources cited above, seeking to immerse myself in this particular social context and conversation.

I used established methods of grounded theory analysis in evaluating the data. Specifically, this process involved:

1. Independent scrutiny of the data to identify relevant and interesting statements about the relation between psychology and religion.

2. Identification of "meaning units" in the various data points.

3. Documentation (memos) of the process and product of research team members' research efforts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

4. Use of the method of constant comparison, which involved collaboration and decision-making regarding which meaning units from the various texts were meaningful and how they might be classified. This procedure also involved the process of comparing new meaning units with existing meaning units, new categories with earlier categories, and so forth.

5. Determination of how meaning units might be assimilated into categories, and how some categories may be subsumed by others (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Here, attempts were made to group meaning units by the extent to which they reflected the essential relation between religion and psychology on both a conceptual and clinical level.

6. In the context of memos (documentation of the research process), development of a preliminary theoretical account of meaning units, categories, and relations among them. Each one of these steps of the research process will be discussed more thoroughly as follows.

Independent reading of the data. Each of the researchers read the selected texts with an ear attuned to the nature of the relation between psychology and religion as depicted by each "voice" quoted from the literature. Initially, I gathered together selected quotes, which I typed up and numbered for ease of reference. Independent scrutiny enabled us to make some preliminary decisions about perspectives on the nature of the relation between religion and psychology. I decided that a criterion for identification of material should be its meaningfulness, or the degree to which it could address this underlying question. I always tried as I read a quote to have it be an answer to the statement, "This portrays the fundamental relation between religion and psychology as _____."

We independently highlighted or underlined portions of the data we found meaningful and salient. Similarly, we indicated which portions of the data we found less meaningful or relevant. We met on several occasions (approximately 5 two-hour meetings) to compare highlighted portions.

Identification of "meaning units." In this phase of data analysis, the selected texts were transferred to index cards to assist with sense making, sorting, and categorization. I worked independently and later collaboratively with the second researcher to identify core concepts on each card, all the while eliminating less relevant and meaningful texts and adding new texts from more recently discovered literature (as reviewing the literature

was an ongoing process throughout the research study). As previously mentioned, criteria for the search for and selection and retention of meaning units included interest, relevance to the underlying research question, variety and spread (of perspectives), elegance, and balance. I attempted individually and collaboratively to identify and document the essential characteristic or content of each meaning unit on the index cards through a restatement of it where helpful. For example, consider the following meaning unit:

> It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. (James, 1985, p. 58)

Attempts to restate the essence of this meaning unit on the index card include the notations, "There is something transcendent about human experience that goes beyond the senses" and "Religious phenomena are not reducible to psychological constructs." Another note read simply, "Psychology cannot do religion."

The primary focus of this phase of analysis was to identify prototypical statements (that is, meaning units that were both representative of ways of thinking about this relation and also uniquely good in their way of portraying it) regarding the nature of the relation between psychology and religion, arising from the lived experience of both psychologists and religionists. For example, an excerpted section from Freud's (1961) The Future of an Illusion demonstrates how this phase of analysis was conducted:

> The riddles of the universe reveal themselves only slowly to our investigation; there are many questions to which science today can give no answer. But scientific work is the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves. (p. 31)

From this text, I highlighted "...scientific work is the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves." This portion of the text seemed more meaningful and relevant than the text as a whole, in part because it was a clear, concise statement about the road to "truth" (about reality) according to Freud, and also because it appeared to sum up the Freud's position on science (versus religion).

Late in the analysis, meaning units and categories became delimited and saturated (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In other words, new meaning units that were discovered in the review of the literature and that were not included originally in the conversational context were represented already by existing meaning units. Similarly, the existing categories were adequate towards assimilation of all later meaning unit classification. Once this occurred, apparently repetitive meaning units were discarded. In instances where the new meaning unit pointed to a new aspect, it was coded and compared with other meaning units. This process continued until it seemed that saturation was reached over all the categories.

As an example, the meaning unit "...real psychology is biblical" (Maudlin, 1998, p. 32) was one of the original meaning units, and it seemed to suggest the notion that the primary lens through which psychology should be seen is through a biblical or religious one. A meaning unit discovered much later in the process of analysis appeared to suggest a similar idea with a slightly different emphasis. The original material from which the

meaning unit was derived stated that, "...nonbelievers may hear all the notes of science, but without the theistic context and perspective, they will not hear the song" (Ratzsch, 2000, p. 159). I chose to include this meaning unit along with "...real psychology is biblical" since both seem to suggest that faith or religion informs and is prior to science in slightly different ways. Other meaning units suggested, by contrast, that science has been and should remain primary and that religious realities are essentially reducible to psychological processes. These meaning units appeared to reflect new and different aspects of the same category since they reflected a more fundamentally scientific or psychological viewpoint. Once meaning units such as these began to reflect the same notions or ideas after they were already well represented, I no longer added them to this category of meaning units.

Therefore, in the ever circular process of acquiring new data and then constantly comparing the new data to existing meaning units and categories, I attempted to achieve both a parsimony of variables and a comprehensive scope of applicability of the meaning units and the emerging theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to the data at hand. I also eliminated meaning units if they appeared to be unclear or only indirectly related to the subject of this study.

Memoing: documentation of the research process. An important part of the process of data analysis was memo writing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Memo writing, or the recording of emergent thoughts, associations, reflections, and so forth, occurred throughout the research study. I wrote notes arising from the research process and occasionally recorded a meeting to capture the process more thoroughly. Analytic memos were employed as opportunities to record insights, associations, themes that

appeared to be emerging from the data, patterns and connections, speculation and "hunches" that were to be explored more fully at a later date (Bogdan & Biklan, 1992). Memos throughout the research process ranged from words and phrases written on the index cards to outlines and narrative work, all of which was recorded to more fully capture and reflect the research process. For example, a memo from the categorization phase reflects the struggle to organize categories along a continuum as follows, "We notice that we are still struggling with the ordering and the arrangement of categories and with our attempts to map out categories on a page. Possible organizing strategies include overlap, separation/integration, need/press, primitive/sophisticated, harmful/helpful, and so forth" (5/26/00). These emergent ideas served as links between meaning units and as a foundation for theoretical elaboration about the relation between religion and psychology.

Constant comparison method of data analysis. I used the constant comparison method, as described by Glaser & Strauss (1967), throughout the process of data analysis. The purpose of this approach to data analysis was to generate theory systematically through the use of explicit coding and analytic procedures (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Glaser and Strauss point out that,

> In contrast to analytic induction, the constant comparative method is concerned with generating and plausibly suggesting (but not provisionally testing) many categories, properties, and hypotheses about general problems.... Since no proof is involved, the constant comparative method in contrast to analytic induction requires only saturation of data—not consideration of *all* available data. (p. 104)

The constant comparative method consisted of four stages: (1) comparing incidents relating to each category, (2) integrating categories as well as their properties,

(3) delimiting the theory, and (4) writing the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). It should be noted that similar items or incidents indicated a pattern to me that was later identified as a particular category.

As I employed this method of constant comparison, new meaning units were compared with those that had emerged earlier in the research process. These meaning units were either considered reflective of previously established categories, or they were identified as meaning units to be assimilated into new categories.

Beginning with the initially selected items (the meaning units recorded on the index cards), I began grouping each meaning unit with others that seemed to give voice to the same concept. For example, one meaning unit read as follows, "Considerable effort was exerted in the development of psychology to distinguish it from its philosophical and pre-scientific beginnings, and the field has progressed as a result" (Ward, 1995, p. 543). This meaning unit appeared to fit with "...scientific work is the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves" (Freud, 1961, p. 31) in placing a value, indeed a premium, on the scientific method in psychology's search for truth. Later in the process, as I added additional meaning units to this grouping, the emerging concept appeared to be that only science (and psychology as science) can lay claim to conceptual truth and practical utility as contrasted with the claims of religion. Other meaning units, voiced from a religious perspective, appeared to be elaborative of a similarly exclusive claim to the pathway to truth. One such example from the New Testament appeared elaborative of the same concept from a different perspective (and perhaps more on the level of praxis rather than of theory). The author of James 5:14-15 suggested that, "The prayer of faith will save the sick, and the Lord will raise them up...." (New Revised

Standard Version) indicating the concept that only faith (religion) is necessary on the path to truth, health, and wellness. This illustrates the process of constant comparison in that once a defining meaning unit for a given category was located, it was used as a point of comparison for new or existing meaning units and was modified as appropriate.

Assimilation of meaning units to categories. This interpretive phase of data analysis actually wove in and out of the constant comparison process, as evidenced by the emergence of the interpretive ideas mentioned above. In this research study, however, this phase of the process was distinguished from the more descriptive (atheoretical) approach to the meaning units, which asked, "What does this meaning unit say about the relation between psychology and religion," to a more interpretive approach, which asked, for example, "How are these meaning units similar and how might we capture the core concept reflected in this cluster of meaning units?"

I decided early on in our review of meaning units that it would be helpful to partition each category along the lines of meaning units reflecting an essentially theoretical or philosophical approach to the relation of psychology and religion, and those reflecting a more practical or methodological approach. This decision was reached through both my initial awareness that the question of the relation between religion and psychology is raised in both intellectual and practical ways and my emerging recognition that the meaning units I had gathered appeared to be landing in both theoretical and clinical camps.

An example of this interpretive process was the recognition that one cluster of items appeared to represent the "other discipline" in a negative light. Both on a theoretical and a practical level, there were illustrations of this perspective from

psychologists (or mental health professionals) as well as religionists. Examples on a philosophical or theoretical level include the meaning units "...psychiatry views religion as neurotic, immature or a solace for the mentally disturbed" (Larson, et. al, 1986, p. 333) and "The individual with a secular consciousness essentially thinks that he is the center of the universe" (Peck, 1997, p. 244) – with both reflecting an apparently negative view of either the religious or the "secular" (nonreligious/scientific) perspective. On a more concrete and clinical level are the items, "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly" (Psalm 1:1, King James Version) and "The concept of sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbance. The sooner psychotherapists forthrightly begin to attack it the better their patients will be" (Ellis, 1961, p. 192). The core category (or overarching concept) appears to be the perspective that the "other" realm or discipline is harmful or destructive.

We met on several occasions to develop an initial categorical scheme. In the initial meetings, approximately 11 core categories emerged, which I struggled to define and refine. As the process of category comparison, identification, and evaluation continued, a final, twelfth category emerged. This phase of the research process therefore resulted in 12 core categories that were continually subjected to the method of constant comparison and evaluated again and again in light of new meaning units with ongoing scrutiny and examination of original meaning units. Categories were labeled to reflect the essential idea represented by meaning units in a particular category. As late as our last analytic meeting, which occurred on May 30, 2000, I was still evaluating the adequacy of our 12 categories and the placement of meaning units and prototypical meaning units therein. I attempted in each subcategory, that is in each

theoretical/philosophical or practical/methodological subcategory of the larger 12 relation categories, to identify a meaning unit that served to convey best the essential defining quality of that category. As an example, in the category described as identifying science and religion as "separate but equal," we identified a prototypical meaning unit for the philosophical/theoretical sub-category (attributed to Martin Luther King) which states that, "Science investigates; religion interprets. Science gives man knowledge which is power; religion gives man wisdom which is control. Science deals mainly with facts; religion deals mainly with values" (Woolf, 6/17/99). The prototypical meaning unit in the methodological/clinical sub-category states simply that, "science can never be religion" (Bunk, 1999), indicating that science reflects a different enterprise than that of religion and thus can never take the place of religion.

I also attempted to diagram the relation between religion and psychology as portrayed by each of the 12 categories. This exercise served to clarify the relation among meaning units and to highlight the relation among categories as well. In addition, the exercise of diagramming the relation between religion and psychology as depicted in the various categories generated new questions about the meaning of the categories and the appropriate ordering of them.

Development of an integrative theoretical account. Meaning units, categories, and sub-categories were analyzed inductively (and supplemented with insights and information from memos) to develop a theory that elaborated the relation between religion and psychology from the perspective of the many voices heard throughout the literature. The a priori assumptions that had originally been bracketed by the researchers were invoked at this stage of theory development, and these assumptions were compared

with the categories derived from the data analysis. Examples from the meaning units were used to illustrate how the theory was grounded in the data. In summary, data sources consisted of original material, ensuing meaning units, emerging categories, and frequent memos. The theory posited by this study was grounded in this data.

CHAPTER FOUR

Results

The results of this ethnographic investigation into the relation between religion and psychology yielded a surprising array of voices and perspectives. Before reviewing the resulting categories and subcategories of this study, it would be far more appropriate to begin by describing the participants in this conversation, as theirs were, in this project, the "voices begging to be heard" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 163).

Participants

The primary voices available to me were those of professionals who have voiced their opinions on the subject of interest in journal articles, books, and interviews. A timely discovery was made by the advisor of this project, who forwarded e-mail discussions to me (from the "Teaching in Psychology" e-mail listserv discussion group) occurring between psychological professionals who were debating the appropriate relation between science and religion. This conversation often led me to other references, suggested by the discussants, including eastern religious perspectives, empirical perspectives, and other voices and viewpoints that added a richness along with depth and breadth to the conversation. As a silent participant observer, I listened in on this engaging, and at times heated, conversation among academicians, literally eavesdropping on an ongoing and contemporary discussion of the topic at hand.

I noticed throughout the research process that my ears were attuned to a variety of sources and voices speaking to the topic of interest. I made a concerted effort to attend to religious viewpoints and perspectives, looking to church publications, e-mail articles, formal addresses, devotional messages, and to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures to ensure that a spectrum of these voices was heard. Toward the end of the research process, I noted that some of these perspectives were not as well represented in the categories of meaning units as some of the other viewpoints I had gathered. I employed a number of strategies to make attempts to locate voices that were not well represented. For example, in categories where religious perspectives were not as thoroughly represented as psychological voices, I looked again to scriptural references, and I went to a local Christian bookstore in search of some of the voices that had not yet reached my ears. Some of these perspectives are now represented in later additions to the meaning units. For example, a late addition to the collection of meaning units was the Christian mandate to "Love your enemies...." (Luke 6:27ff, New Revised Standard Version), paraphrased as "Love those who hate you.... Treat others as you would have them treat you." This was added as an (religious) illustration of the category suggesting that religion and psychology are ethically obligated to be respectful of one another.

With regard to my involvement in the process as both a participant and an observer, I found myself struggling to hear all of the voices that I was able to and attempting to remain faithful to the intent of the speakers, often by referring back to the original citation, and, if necessary, to the context in which the voice was located. In a memo note, for example, I acknowledged the "process of empathic identification with the authors" and my struggle to discern "What were they thinking?" "What experiences led

them to say this?" "What perspective do they bring to this discussion?" The resulting categories and the meaning units from which these categories emerged, discussed in the ensuing pages, reflect my attempts to describe the voices I heard both faithfully and efficiently.

Procedure

As previously suggested, I employed an ethnographic approach to data collection and a grounded theory method of analysis in evaluating the data. This ethnographic eavesdropping eventually yielded more than 167 "voices" or quotations as potential meaning units. As these 167 citations were subjected to both independent and collaborative scrutiny, it was noted that a number of them reflected more than one relevant, interesting, and concisely stated idea. These were therefore subsequently subdivided into separate meaning units (and labeled as 41a and 41b, for example). Potential meaning units that did not meet the criteria of relevance, elegance, conciseness, and so forth were discarded. In the end, data analysis resulted in a total of 146 meaning units, all of which were used to help illuminate and interpret the relation between religion and psychology as depicted by the participants in this slice of conversation.

As I approached the task of organizing, grouping, and making sense of these meaning units, I began by reviewing the meaning units, which I had transferred to index cards, both independently and collaboratively with my fellow researcher, noting on the cards my sense of the essential idea conveyed by the meaning unit. Some of these notations actually became the meaning units I used to compare and contrast with others, as they represented the core ideas more concisely and efficiently. Citation number 82 would be an example of this process. The initial meaning unit read as, "If we cannot see

or measure something...then I believe what we should say is that we have no reason to believe that it exists" (Clark, 1999). The notation on the index card, made after reflecting on the meaning unit and consulting the original text, states, "We should only research tangible, quantifiable constructs." This appeared to capture, for me, the essential notion that the science of psychology should deal only with matters that are visible, measurable, and subject to experimentation and manipulation.

This process of clarifying and condensing the ideas represented in the meaning units continued throughout the process even as I began to sort the meaning units into similar groups. We spent several sessions collaboratively sorting meaning units into categories that seemed similar to one another, discussing our hunches about how they fit together as we continued to locate the meaning units in different groups. A process memo from this phase of the analysis highlights my efforts to maximize both the internal coherence as well as the distinctiveness of each group of meaning units or, in the words of the memo note, "meaning units grouped together should be similar to one another, and meaning units in separate groups should be dissimilar to other clusters of meaning units."

As I sorted meaning units into groups, ideas about the essential nature of each of the categories began to emerge, and I attempted to capture these ideas in the form of a colloquial labeling, such as "The other is bad." This type colloquial phrasing and labeling reflected the conversational tone and tenor of this research project. As I continued to assess and refine, condense and evaluate the groupings of meaning units, a memo note reflects the questions that informed the process of sense making in an ongoing way, "(1) Do our piles make sense? (2) Do our colloquial labelings make sense? (3) Do our theory/practice distinctions make sense and hold up? (4) Are categories worth

keeping separate, or do they need to be collapsed? (5) Have we reached saturation?" I also continued to ask myself, "Are we hearing all the voices? Who have we failed to listen to and where have we neglected to look for perspectives on this subject?"

This extensive process of data analysis resulted in 12 overall categories that have been further subdivided into (A) the philosophical/theoretical level and (B) the clinical/methodological level. A comprehensive depiction of the resulting categories and their respective labels, principle statements (summary statements), and meaning units is represented in Table 1. The original quotation and source of each of the meaning units may be found in the Appendix. For example, in order to locate the original quotation and source of the first meaning unit listed in Table 1, or the meaning unit denoted as (25b), one would simply refer to Category One, meaning unit (25b) in the Appendix, which lists the original quotation as well as the source of this particular voice.

As noted above, a summary statement for each category is included just below the category heading or label. In this principle statement, I attempted to summarize the essence of the relation between the two constructs as depicted by each category. Therefore, the reader may look to each category labeling and the ensuing principle statement for a concise summation of the core ideas represented in the category.

The prototypical meaning units for each subcategory offer further elaborative information. These are presented in the form of an original quotation. All other meaning units, for ease of reference, are listed as paraphrases or as rephrases of the essential idea conveyed by the meaning unit. The brackets, in which these other meaning units are contained, serve as an indication that the enclosed material is a paraphrase and not an original quotation.

Table 1

Categorization Scheme of Perspectives on the Relation Between Religion and Psychology

Category 1: The other is bad because it is harmful or destructive.

Adherence to any but the correct model is theoretically untenable and clinically harmful.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(25b) "...psychiatry views religion as neurotic, immature or a solace for the mentally disturbed." [a]
(129) {religion as a refuge from direct encounters with reality – science as developing checks and methods to counter self-deception}
(130) {Religious ideas are protected by their mythical and untestable nature.}
(149) {Psychology undervalues and often dismisses matters of religion and faith.}
(162) {Psychology has "ripped away" at the foundation of religion/faith.}
(112) {religion as the correct perspective – "sacred consciousness" perspective}
(111) {secular beliefs/practices as misguided, immature, wrong}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(3a) "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly." [a]
(3b) {Humanistic assumptions and practices threaten to subvert religion}
(140a) {Psychologists are seen as "too dumb to accept salvation," hence how could they possibly be helpful?}
(9) {Religious constructs/beliefs are at the root of psychological disturbance.}
(36) {Psychologists think that religious beliefs should be eradicated.}
(13) {Clergy do not have the education or ability to step outside their religious worldview to be helpful with psychological problems.}
(131) {Religion is unnecessary at best and destructive at worst.}
(138) {religiosity and devotion as indicative of personal problems in the eyes of psychologists}
(140b) {Religious faith as a panacea for psychological distress and as extending denial and complicating treatment.}
(141) {Clergy are doing harm given their lack of psychological training.}

Category 2: There is only one, "true" way and no need for the other.

Either psychology or religion can lay claim to conceptual truth and practical utility.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(63) "...scientific work is the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves." [a]
(88) {Science as I define it is uniquely valid and legitimate.}
(87) {We should not move science toward religion. It trivializes science}
(82) {We should only deal with tangible and quantifiable constructs.}
(62) {...religious ideas are illusions....}
(61) {...our science is no illusion....}
(12.a) {psychology as science and as distinguishable from philosophy/religion.}
(132) {Dialogue between the two should not be constructive – value of science.}
(163) {The humanistic worldview should be replaced with the religious.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(60) "Are any among you sick? ...The prayer of faith will save the sick, and the Lord will raise them up...." [a]
(7) {Sooner or later, psychology must adopt religious principles and address religious issues.}
(165) {Religion is sufficient for obtaining wholeness and healing and overcoming fear.}
(91) {There is no valid alternative to science as source of knowledge about the world}

Category 3: One subsumes or informs the other.

Practically and theoretically, one is ontologically superior or reductionistically prior.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(4) "...real psychology is biblical" [a]
(32) {Spiritual principles inform psychology.}
(95) {Faith equals behavior resulting from contingencies.}
(41a) {spiritual view of human nature and personality}
(109) {In the end, all things point to God.... – Psychology reduces to religious constructs.}
(115) {Religion informs even statistically improbable events.}
(8) {Ontologically, the origin of human problems is reducible to religious constructs of sin and guilt.}
(161) {Faith or religion organizes and undergirds scientific knowledge.}
(164) {In psychology, Christ is at the center as Savior of the soul.}
(73) {All religion is neurologically informed/located.}

(76) {"neurobiology of faith" – faith reduced to neurobiological processes}
(74) {Scientific (neurological) findings inform religious experience.}
(90) {Science should remain primary. Scientific studies of religion versus promotion of religious perspective in psychology.}
(99) {Religious 'realities' are reducible to childhood psychological processes.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(41b) "Efforts have been made...to propose moral and spiritual frames of reference for therapy." [a]
(1) {At the core, psychological problems are spiritual.}
(72) {Virtually all problems are religious at their source.}
(55) {For a rabbi, helping others to deal with life includes mental health issues.}
(142) {For the fundamentalist, all problems are seen as spiritual.}

Category 4: I did not know there was a problem.

There is no apparent conflict between psychology and religion either in practice or in theory.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(43) "...most priests and most therapists are conceptually confused...with respect to spirituality" [a]
(79) {Why should I question the "great men of science" who saw no conflict?}
(157) {I don't really know what the issue is. We can be religious and be scientists in the appropriate contexts.}
(158) {I see no conflict between the two.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(144) "Unfortunately, all too often either a priest or therapist presumes to a competence he does not have and should not be expected to have, or assimilates what he sees to his own specialty." [a]
(137) {Psychologists are not interested, either professionally or personally, in the religious world view.}
(143) {A lack of interest in religious values is one reason that psychologists do not collaborate with clergy.}
(160) {Conflicts between the value systems of clinicians and clients are either dealt with unsystematically by clinicians or are not dealt with at all.}

Category 5: They are separate and equally valid.

Both are part of the human enterprise – just different philosophically and methodologically.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(93a) "Science investigates; religion interprets. Science gives man knowledge which is power; religion gives man wisdom which is control. Science deals mainly with facts; religion deals mainly with values." [a]
(11) {Science and religion involve different epistemic assumptions and methods.}
(6) {Psychology is useful for providing knowledge about human beings. Theology is useful for providing knowledge about God.}
(17a) {They represent different angles of vision.}
(134) {Their areas of influence and investigation are different.}
(85) {There is a place for both science and religion.}
(92) {Science and religion are different realms of exploration that can co-exist but that do not overlap.}
(89) {Science and religion do not overlap.}
(100) {Representations of God are different from realities of God.}
(67) {Psychology can't "do" religion. There is something transcendent about human experience that goes beyond the senses.}
(133) {There is an essential and irreducible mystery that science will never eliminate.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(135) "...science can never be religion...." [a]
(42) {Psychology can only do psychology. We cannot experiment psychologically
with phenomena that cannot be manipulated.}
(34) {referral to clergy for religious issues – different from psychological issues}
(35) {Religious issues are irrelevant to and different from the practice of psychology, and, as such, are often avoided in psychotherapy.}
(136) {Counseling in a secular university is an amoral enterprise that does not involve fixing "problems of character."}
(5b) {Therapeutic processes are both similar to and distinct from (even incompatible with) Christian approaches to counseling.}

Category 6: We are obligated to be respectful.

Ethics mandates that one respect the other in theory and in practice.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(14) "As psychologists, we have an ethical responsibility to understand differences among people..." [a]
(144) {Psychologists must respect and understand the client's belief system.}
(150) {Principle D requires psychologists to respect client autonomy and self-determination, which includes the dimension of religious belief.}
(154) {Love those who hate you....Treat others as you would have them treat you.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(152) "Consultation requires a member of one profession to value what the other profession has to offer...." [a]
(96) {Clinical training should include religion as one dimension of human diversity}
(151) {Graduate training should include education in religion as one aspect of multicultural diversity.}
(37a) {Psychology should respect client autonomy.}
(27b) {...they (psychologists) need to recognize and respect the basic worldview of clergy and parishioners.}
(20) {...when clients come to therapy, they need to feel heard and understood in order for change to take place}
(54a) {Collaborative therapies work within the core value structure of the client, moving therapy in directions consonant with the client's values.}
(19) {...if...the client sees God as a part of the problem, then God should be included in the therapeutic conversation}
(54b) {Therapy should not judge against "established standard."}

Category 7: We must come to terms with one another.

For the sake of a greater conceptual and practical good, both must work together.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(17b) "Human suffering's demands overflow the banks of neatly separated roles." [a]
(10) {Each must take the other into account on an epistemological and ontological level in order to more fully address the whole of reality.}
(16) {There is a spiritual dimension of experience that psychology must come to terms with.}

(103) {Everyone is innately spiritual. Therefore explanations and interactions must include this dimension.}
(107) {We ought to include religious issues in psychological treatment for reasons of cultural inclusion, mental health, and values.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(17a) "...artificial distinctions of separate territories, roles, and power bases dissolve in the sweaty struggle in behalf of the best interests of the patient." [a]
(2) {Healing demands interaction and integration.}
(108) {I will speak the language of all that some may be saved.}

Category 8: Something is lost if we do not try to bridge the two.

There are costs to not working toward conceptual and practical integration.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(56) "...to ignore a social phenomenon as widespread as religion and spirituality is, in essence, to devalue a significant part of cultural life and ethical experience." [a]
(139) {The human sciences cannot ignore or short-change the religious dimension of human activity without doing violence to it.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(71) "If I recognize only naturalistic values, and explain everything in physical terms, I shall depreciate, hinder or even destroy the spiritual development of my patients. And if I hold exclusively to a spiritual interpretation, then I shall misunderstand and do violence to the natural man in his right to existence as a physical being." [a]
(21) {Nonreligious therapists ignore religious issues and treat religious beliefs as pathological.}
(51) {If we do not consider religion, we ignore or pathologize clients' concerns.}
(18) {Without training, counselors may miss opportunities to support and foster the psychological growth of clients with religious or spiritual concerns.}

Category 9: The other is worth paying attention to.

There are abstract, philosophical, and practical benefits to acknowledging the other.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(69) "...I attribute a positive value to all religions... their symbolism... their moral teachings....I likewise attribute a positive value to biology, and to the empiricism of natural science in general...." [a]
(27a) {Religions are more than moral codes or methods of seeking life after death. They reflect values worth exploring.}
(167) {Cooperation, mutual understanding and respect must develop between clergy and the psychological professions. Serious thought must be given by each to the factors that lead to a distorted view of sin and guilt and the degree to which this affects mental illness.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(25c) "...the psychologically healthy are more religious and engage in more religious activities." [a]
(23) {Religion is a complex and potentially rich construct for researchers.}
(24) {Psychiatry would benefit from research of religious variables.}

Category 10: We win if we build bridges.

There are conceptual and practical benefits to interaction between what are essentially two good and worthwhile systems.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(40) {There are reasons for bringing the two together.} "Much of the ...superstructure for a rapprochement between religious and secular psychotherapy is in place." [a]
(93b) {Science and religion are not rivals. They are complementary.}
(153) {Both the church and psychiatry/psychology are moving toward a rapprochement, in recognition of the extent to which clergy are consulted for emotional and mental problems.}
(154) {There should be a positive outcome to educating clergy about mental illness.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(26) "Ideally, religious communities and psychologists will collaborate to enhance personality change and adjustment...." [a]
(114) {Integrating faith and reason (religion and psychology) leads to greater wholeness or "integrity."}

(127) {A spiritual practice is complemented by a good psychotherapy.}
(166) {A conversation between popular Christian writers and psychiatrists about the realities of severe depression would benefit both.}
(22) {Professional benefit – increased learning opportunities – to interaction.}
(150) {Mental health would be enhanced in underserved areas by media presentations and Web-based resources involving both professions.}
(159) {There is research indicating the health benefits of spirituality and prayer.}
(101) {The main task of the therapist is to facilitate the client's process of becoming true to self and to God.}
(31) {It is hoped that the bi-directional, co-professional model will encourage a more cooperative interaction between psychologists and clergy.}
(138) {The tools of science are appropriate to the data of spiritual experience.}
(53) {The psychologist informed about...religion...can more sensitively assess and treat....}
(106) {We are calling for an appreciation of the significance of religion in mental health and treatment.}
(70) {If we want to break the biological (psychological) spell, we need to rediscover religion.}

Category 11: All is one. It is really the same stuff.

When engaging in one (in thought or in practice), we are engaging in the other.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(57) "By calling this a religious experience, what I mean is that I experienced salvation in it. All those fractured parts of myself—the math part, the verbal part, the physical part, the spiritual part—they all came together that day. I felt like someone whose multiple personality disorder had been healed." [a]
(58) {The whole is the fundamental unity of reality.}
(59) {All is one – one body, one Spirit, one Lord, one faith....God is in all, above all and through all.}
(68) {Religious constructs/psychological constructs – different names for the same processes}
(120) {Buddhism as 'science of the mind.' Religion is psychology.}
(125) {Buddhist notion that there is no separate thing.}

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(28) "...I am not so sure that there is a distinct difference between clergy and counselor." [a]
(5a) ...therapeutic virtues are often similar to the Christian virtues....
(39) {Unconditional positive regard is the way Christianity looks in practice.}
(77) {In learning about human life, we will necessarily learn about God.}

Category 12: Both are really about something else.

Principle statement: Both reduce to a third construct that does not live in either camp.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical

(113) "The original relationship between religion and science was one of integration. And this integration had a name – philosophy." [a]
(78) {...both science and religion rest on faith.}
(80) {The Creator's manuscript was nature. That manuscript was written in the language of mathematics.}
(122) {The psyche was left to the priests, who eventually differentiated into philosophers, poets, artists and psychiatrists.}
(124) {Both are about what 'works' and what is 'reality.'}
(127) {Both are about new – postmodernist – ways of seeing – an open-mindedness toward all forms of knowledge.}
(121) {Religion is philosophy and philosophy is inner science (psychology).}

B. Methodological/Clinical

(46a) "Thus what matters most as the waves and billows pour over us is not so much whether we seek out a minister or priest or a psychotherapist, as whether the one we choose to work with has at least formal access to the domain of transcendence...." [a]
(155) {Friendship is what is fundamental to all psychotherapeutic and pastoral relationships.}
(46) {Both priests and therapists function essentially as either crusader or emancipator.}
(167) {An enhanced quality of life is the aim of religion and psychology.}

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[a] Prototypical meaning units for each subcategory.

A visual examination of the resulting categories reveals the internal order and overall arrangement of the findings of this study. Namely, I have grouped the meaning units into categories and arranged and ordered them along several dimensions. Initially, I grouped the meaning units according to similarity of perspective (e.g., meaning units that seemed to describe an exclusive claim to conceptual or clinical truth). When I was satisfied with the categories and subcategories, and when the established categories began to demonstrate saturation as well as reliability in locating newly discovered meaning

units, I struggled with arranging the categories along a more horizontal continuum. At this juncture in the analysis, visually representing each of the categories served as a useful aid in clarifying the presence of the two constructs in relation to one another, as represented by each category, as well as the valence associated with the constructs. (The individual diagrams and their helpfulness will be elaborated upon more fully in the discussion of each of the resulting categories.) A memo note during this phase of the analytic process reveals that the process of diagramming the constructs aided in the task of identifying the "essential qualities of our categories, the presence of psychology and religion in the field together, along with the size of the constructs, their location and valence, the relation between them, the energy between them, and linkage." For these reasons, the diagrams have been included in the discussion of each of the categories. In addition, it is hoped that the diagrams may serve the same purpose for the reader as well, shedding some additional light on the relation between the constructs and stimulating further thought on the subject.

In the same way, I was aided in my understanding and clarification of the resulting categories by writing restatements of the essence of each category, which were then termed "principle statements" and which are found in Table 1 located below each of the category headings. The discovery of new meaning units also tested the adequacy of the category labels and the depth of my understanding of each of these perspectives.

In the final analysis, it made the most sense to me to arrange the twelve categories along a horizontal continuum according to the valence associated with the other construct and with the process of attending to the other construct (e.g., from a negative valence to

an increasingly positive valence). Again, this description will be more fully illuminated and elaborated upon in the description of each of the categories that follows.

In describing each of the resulting categories, I will not provide a restatement or summary of our findings, as Table 1 provides a very thorough and complete account of the results. Instead, I will highlight how I came to understand the categories, what seemed interesting or surprising, and what I noted during the struggle to define and illustrate each of the 12 categories.

Category 1: The other is bad because it is harmful or destructive.

In the category I came to term "the other is bad," the negative valence associated with the other construct was noted in many of the voices. Theoretical meaning units referred to the alternate construct as "neurotic," "immature," "false," a refuge, and as "ripping at the very foundation" of the other. Similarly, methodological meaning units referred to the purveyors of the other construct as "ungodly," threatening, "dumb," uneducated, "unnecessary," "destructive," and "doing harm." This negative valence is depicted by a minus sign located within the "other" construct in Figure 1.

Alternately, some of the meaning units in this category reference the construct with which the speaker identifies as positive. One speaks of a "sacred consciousness," another of blessedness. Other meaning units on the methodological level portray purveyors of the "correct" model as needing to attack and eradicate the other. This perceived threat and the intensity of the negative valence associated with "the other" impressed me as I reviewed the meaning units. One memo reflects this awareness of a negative valence, observing that this grouping of meaning units "speaks specifically to consequences of adverse participation in the other."

In my struggle to represent the dynamics of these meaning units visually, one memo note suggests that both constructs are present in the territory of praxis and theory "one vertically superior to the other." Therefore the diagram for this category of meaning units reflects the vertical relation of the constructs, one superior to the other, and the positive valence of the "correct model" as I named it in the principle statement, along with a negative valence for the other construct. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1



Note. On this and subsequent diagrams, the box delineates the territory of praxis and theory. The other shapes represent the constructs of interest. Symbols located within the constructs represent the valence associated with them.

Category 2: There is only one, "true" way and no need for any other.

Essential to this category is the idea conveyed in the principle statement, the assertion that either psychology or religion can lay claim to conceptual truth and practical utility but both cannot. It seems that the meaning units in this category all represent, in some form or fashion, the perspective that either psychology (science) or religion is the unique and singular pathway to truth. The prototypical meaning unit, "...scientific work is the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves" is a good example of the voice in this chorus as is the clinical prototype, "Are any among you sick?

...The prayer of faith will save the sick, and the Lord will raise them up...." Thus, either science or religion can teach us about reality or heal us and make us well. To each voice, the other is unheard and unnecessary.

The voices represented in this category seem to have sounded out clear and strong from the start. My initial memo indicates that the essence of this category remained consistent to me as reflected in the initial labeling "only one true way." These meaning units are among the clearest and most unambiguous in their conviction of the correct model ontologically and epistemologically. The statements that "...religious ideas are illusions..." and "...our science is no illusion..." are clear in their declaration that religion has no place in the realm of theorizing about reality or in helping humanity to understand and to deal with "reality." Similarly, other meaning units suggest that Christ is all that is needed to understand the world (on a theoretical level) and to heal our afflictions (on a clinical level).

As I considered the relation of these constructs diagrammatically from the standpoint of the voices informing this category, I added a memo indicating, "one construct is irrelevant and unnecessary to the other." In fact, the diagram depicting this category (see Figure 2) conveys this idea clearly. One construct (the chosen one) is placed within the realm of theory and praxis and the other construct is portrayed as completely outside the territory of praxis and theory (i.e., the box). There is, in this category, no consideration afforded the alternative construct. Thus, whereas in the previous category the other construct was portrayed negatively, the alternate construct as depicted in this category simply has no value or valence associated with it.

Figure 2



Note: The positive valence of the chosen construct is indicated by the plus sign.

Category 3: One subsumes or informs the other.

The meaning units in this category reflect the idea that either psychology or religion is primary. One is either more fundamental than the other or serves as the lens through which to make sense of the other. A good example of a meaning unit expressing the notion of one construct serving as a primary lens for the other, or of one subsuming the other, is the voice that asserts, "Faith equals behavior resulting from contingencies." Faith (religion), according to this meaning unit, can be explained with the methods of science. Science is the lens through which faith makes sense. Another meaning unit suggests that the opposite is true. Speaking from a more practical level, the voice from which this meaning unit arises suggests that, "At the core, psychological problems are spiritual." Another echoes, "Virtually all problems are religious at their source." Religion and matters of the spirit, these latter voices intimate, are primary and fundamental to the struggles and problems of humanity.

Meaning units for this category were discovered and located with relative ease, especially those located in subcategory A, the philosophical/theoretical level of discourse. Similarly, labeling of the category remained consistent throughout the process of

analysis. An initial memo suggests my emerging understanding of this category as "individual attempts to define the opposing construct as reducing it to psychology or religion." In the same way, the tendency for these voices to suggest that one informs the other is noted in the memo note that reads, "religion informs psychology or psychology informs religion."

I portrayed this category visually as depicted in Figure 3, with one construct covering the other. Both constructs, as portrayed by this category of meaning units, are within the territory of praxis and theory, but one assumes an organizing or primary position. One construct subsumes the other. Therefore, the more fundamental and overarching category is depicted in Figure 3 as an arc covering the construct that is considered more secondary.

Figure 3



Category 4: I did not know there was a problem.

This category was perhaps the most difficult category to define, delineate, and depict for a number of reasons. Initially there were only a few voices, or meaning units, that suggested the essential idea that there did not seem to be a problem in assessing the relation between religion and psychology. One such example is reflected in the meaning

unit from the philosophical/theoretical subcategory, "Why should I question the great men of science who saw no conflict?" Another meaning unit from this same subcategory describes therapists as "conceptually confused" about the nature of spirituality. Meaning units in the methodological subcategory describe a "lack of interest" in religion on the part of psychologists as well as a methodological or clinical confusion on the part of therapists and religionists with regard to the value systems and the boundaries of religion and psychology.

Memo notes from analysis of this category indicate my difficulty in describing and delimiting this point of view. One such memo note refers to the "boundaries of contact and the territory of conflict between religion and psychology as fuzzy" in this category. Perhaps I was experiencing the lack of awareness and the confusion described in the meaning units as I tried to depict them clearly. For these reasons, my visual representation of this category depicts the constructs of interest as "fuzzy" or unclear. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4



Note. Not only are the boundaries of the constructs "fuzzy" in this category, but the places and the ways in which they intersect are equally unclear.

In summary, this category represents the myriad of voices describing confusion or a lack of interest in or awareness about issues related to the relation between religion and psychology.

Category 5: They are separate and equally valid.

Unlike the meaning units in the previous category, the voices that make up the chorus in the "separate" category appeared to place a value on both constructs, indicating that they are both meaningful enterprises, just distinct. One meaning unit in particular describes both constructs as "useful" in different ways. Another highlights some of the differing gifts of each enterprise, stating that, "Science investigates; religion interprets. Science gives man knowledge which is power; religion gives man wisdom which is control. Science deals mainly with facts; religion deals mainly with values." Therefore, there is no negative valence associated with one of the constructs as depicted by these meaning units. Both, in fact, are viewed as meaningful and valuable enterprises – a sentiment expressed in the diagram of this category by the positive value located within each of the constructs.

One observation as reflected in my colloquial labeling of this category is the representation of the two constructs as "separate." I noted in a memo that there is "no mention of bringing the two together" by those in this category. Words used to describe the relation between religion and psychology in this category include "distinct," "different assumptions and methods," differing "areas of influence." Many describe the relation between the two as involving no overlap or as co-existing separately. This is reflected in methodological meaning units that speak of referrals to members involved in the other enterprise. The separate nature of the constructs is also highlighted by the

clinical statements that "science can never be religion" and "psychology can only do psychology."

In Figure 5, the equality of the constructs is portrayed by their vertical alignment side by side. The center, curvilinear barrier represents intentional exclusion and separateness, while the positive value of each is identified with positive signs within the constructs.

Figure 5



Category 6: We are obligated to be respectful.

What impressed me in this category is captured in a memo note observing the use of words like, "should, must, required, responsibility to" in the meaning units located here. The meaning unit that declares, "...we have an ethical responsibility to understand differences among people..." highlights my sense that, in this grouping of meaning units, a common thread is an ethically mandated respect for the other. For this reason, I chose to represent the two constructs visually as interacting through an ethical mandate, or an external mediator (e.g., an ethical code). In Figure 6, therefore, interaction is represented

as filtered through this ethical mandate. There is no particular valence associated with the interaction.

Figure 6



Note: The "E" located within the triangle represents the "ethical code" or "external mandate" through which interaction between the constructs is filtered.

Category 7: We must come to terms with one another.

In this category about coming to terms with one another, much of the same language is reflected in the meaning units as in the preceding category. Words like "must," "should," "ought to," "demands," find their place among these voices too. A memo note indicates my emerging sense of these items as portraying, "1) territories as separate, 2) external structures demanding integration" – characteristics also similar to those of the preceding category. As observed in another memo notation, however, "the demand characteristics of these items are external to either." The external demand characteristic reflected in these meaning units is not an ethical code stemming from one construct or the other but, as I have chosen to term it in the principle restatement of this category, a "greater good." The relation depicted in this category, then, is that of constructs working together for a greater good that is unidentified with any particular tradition.

In Figure 7, therefore, the external demand is portrayed, once again, by a triangle shape, but there is no identification of the triangle, as before. This intentional omission signifies my assessment that the external demand represents various "greater goods," which are not identified exclusively with either of the constructs. The constructs (circles) are represented as working together (arrows), which appears to be viewed as positive from the perspective of the meaning units located here. The positive valence associated with interacting is indicated by plus signs located above the symbols for interaction and discourse.

Figure 7



Category 8: Something is lost if we do not try to bridge the two.

This category, as contrasted with the previous category, is described using negative terminology. "There are costs to not working toward conceptual and practical integration." "We lose out if we do not try to bridge the two." The category label reflects the negative impact of not bridging the constructs as portrayed in meaning units that refer to "devaluing" or "doing violence to" the other or treating the other as "pathological." The meaning units in this category seem to depict a lack of interaction between the constructs as costly in some form or fashion.

A memo note from the investigation of the meaning units in this category indicates that meaning units were "really hard to find in professional literature in both camps." Nevertheless, the meaning units grouped in both of the subcategories suggest that the cost of "ignoring" or "short-changing" the other construct or of focusing exclusively on one construct, in other words of not forming some kind of bridge across the divide between psychology and religion, results in some type of harm.

I struggled with how to represent this visually in a way that honored the essence of the category. The result of my efforts, as presented in Figure 8, is the depiction of one construct sitting atop another. The construct on the bottom end of things appears diminished (flattened or squashed) by the construct "on top."

Figure 8



Category 9: The other is worth paying attention to.

Though meaning units in this category were difficult to find, those that are located in this category seem to ascribe a positive value to what one memo note describes as "the process of perspective taking." The meaning units in this category appear to suggest that there is value to be found in the process of "exploring," giving serious thought to, researching – paying attention to – the other construct. They seem to assert, "Hey, there

is something worth looking into." In Figure 9, the symbols of positive valence (plus signs) are therefore located above the arrows, which represent the process of attending to the other.

Figure 9



Category 10: We win if we build bridges.

It is evident by glancing at the number of meaning units in this category (see Table 1) that meaning units were easily found for this category, especially for subcategory B, or the methodological/clinical subcategory. That these meaning units were easily discovered "does not necessarily serve as an indication that many of the voices are singing this tune," as one memo note suggests. There are a number of possible explanations for this observation that will be explored more fully in the discussion of this category.

Essential to this category is the assertion that there are benefits, both practical and conceptual, to interaction between these two constructs. In fact, at least one meaning unit declares that the integration of the two will lead to increased benefits ("greater wholeness and integrity"). Therefore, as compared and contrasted with the previous category, the meaning units in this category also appear to value interaction between the two spheres of

exploration and influence, but they add a dimension in suggesting both theoretical and concrete benefits or outcomes to the process of interaction. As one meaning unit states, "There are reasons for bringing the two together."

Figure 10 is thus very similar to Figure 9, since both categories reflect a value placed on interaction between the areas of interest. A difference noted in the meaning units for this category, however, is the apparently positive value placed on the other enterprise as complementary, for example, and therefore as adding a unique perspective. This difference is depicted by the positive symbols located within each construct in Figure 10.

Figure 10



Category 11: All is one. It is really the same stuff.

Examination of the meaning units and the category I came to term "all is one" revealed that some of the voices suggest, as does one in particular, that there is no separate thing. These meaning units share the core assumption that "it's all the same thing," to put it colloquially and informally. Psychology and religion, in other words, are talking about the same phenomena and the same reality and are simply using different language to describe it. A good example of this perspective is the declaration that

"Religious constructs/psychological constructs – different names for the same processes" to use the language of a meaning unit. Another suggests, "In learning about human life, we will necessarily learn something about God." Hence, the restatement of the essential idea, "When engaging in one (in thought or in practice), we are engaging in the other."

Figure 11 therefore expresses this core idea by visually representing the two constructs as interwoven and as making up the same whole. All is one, and these two constructs are but two of the strands making up the one thing.

Figure 11



Category 12: Both are really about something else.

This category did not emerge until late in the process. A memo note from the phase of examining the meaning units highlights the sudden realization that "Both are derivative from, predicated upon, the same stuff." Hence, the restatement of the essence of the category, "Both reduce to a third construct that does not live in either camp." Illustrations of this notion from the meaning units are captured in the descriptions of psychology and religion as being all about "philosophy," "faith," "mathematics," the "psyche," about "what works," about "transcendence" and "friendship" and emancipation.

In Figure 12, therefore, both of the constructs of interest are literally reduced "into" a third construct.

Figure 12



Having briefly described each of the 12 categories, it seems logical to discuss the arrangement of their presentation. First, it must be acknowledged that there are, no doubt, a number of equally valid and meaningful ways of representing the resulting categories along a continuum of dimensions. I have already indicated that a number of dimensions were considered in examining and making sense of the categories, such as the energy and the valence between them, their separateness or their interrelatedness, and so forth.

I began the process of ordering the categories by initially attempting to arrange them along a continuum of "pulling apart" moving toward integration. This initial attempt was unsuccessful, perhaps because it did not fit the categories and the voices within them as I understood them at the time. I then ordered the categories along the dimension of clarity, from diffuse to increasingly clear. In the end, however, it makes the most sense to me to arrange the categories as I have presented them in this section, along a continuum of several dimensions, which will be more fully elaborated in the discussion

that follows. Suffice it to say, that one way of ordering and arranging these categories that seems faithful to the data is on a continuum ranging from an antagonistic and adversarial relation between the two constructs to an increasingly friendly, even harmonious, inclusive and integrated relation between the two. A visual representation of this continuum might be depicted as follows in Figure 13.

Figure 13

Note: Please note the inclusion of a number of variables and dimensions along the continuum of categories. These different variables and dimensions will be invoked and more fully elaborated upon in the discussion section to follow.

Much more can and will be said about the ordering of the categories in the next section. For now, suffice it to say that the arrangement of categories as depicted in Figure 13 seems faithful to the richness and the diversity of voices represented among the 12 categories and to their perspectives on the relation between religion and psychology.

CHAPTER FIVE

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between psychology and religion as it has been described by a range of voices rising out of the lived experience of religion and psychology and to develop a theory of the relation grounded in these perspectives. To this end, a theoretical elaboration of the results obtained in this study will suggest a way of understanding and approaching the relation between religion and psychology as it is represented by these data.

The process by which this will be accomplished will begin with an examination of the participants involved in this study, the process and procedures, and, finally, the resulting meaning units and categories. The intent of this examination and attending discussion is not to offer "the" way of seeing and making sense of these data but to suggest one way of making sense of them and of understanding how we come to the task of making sense of the relation between religion and psychology. It is hoped that this will encourage and incite further discussion and investigation rather than foreclose it.

In the results section of this study, I have described the categories, depicted the relation between religion and psychology as portrayed by each of the categories, and highlighted issues such as the valence, the energy, and the location of the constructs in relation to one another as represented by each of the 12 perspectives. The task in this discussion of the results of our study is not to describe these perspectives on the relation

between the constructs over again, but to infer and to interpret and to make educated statements about how we come to these various perspectives on the relation between psychology and religion.

Beginning with an evaluation of the process and procedures will help to pave the way for a review of participant contributions and of further interpretation and elaboration of meaning units and categories. Specifically, I would like to highlight what seems now to have been an emerging recognition and a recurring theme throughout my examination of the meaning units and categories and the consequent arranging, ordering and differentiating between them. Memo notes allude to "need" and "press" (Murray, 1938) and the sense that there were salient differences among the voices with regard to felt need to make sense of the relation between these constructs and the "press," or pressure from the external environment, to do so. Memo notes such as, "therapist desire beginning to emerge here" and "external forces demand" and "internally driven (doesn't speak to external)" run throughout the process of categorization and sense making of the individual meaning units, their grouping into categories, and the eventual arrangement of these categories along a continuum. In addition, toward the end of the research process, memo notes such as "adversarial," "tolerance," and "openness" were used to describe differences among the perspectives and their approaches to the "other" construct.

In reviewing the variety of apparent needs and press to make sense of the relation between these two constructs and other internal/external distinctions, such as reliance on internal desire versus external authority, discussion between myself and my advisor about theories of identity development have shed some light on my own place in this conversation as well as on the location of others. Specifically, James E. Marcia's (1980)

portrayal of ego identity development and, from the "other" perspective, James W. Fowler's (1981; 1996) depiction of faith development both speak to this issue of reliance on external authority (for a sense of identity, self-esteem, "faith," and so forth) and the progression in development toward reliance on the inner self (ego) and the consequent increase in flexibility, nondefensiveness, and openness toward others and other points of view.

I will illustrate their helpfulness in illuminating the differences represented herein by beginning with observations about myself and my own participation in this enterprise since, after all, this study emerged from my interests, needs, desires, and questions about the constructs of religion and psychology. No doubt my selection of an interpretive approach has already highlighted information about my own participation in this process and what I bring to the project. Namely, it seemed appropriate to me to include both psychological and religious voices in the interpretation of the results. The particular voices chosen to help in theoretically elaborating my findings seem to fit together nicely. The extent to which this is true will be discussed and evaluated more fully in the pages that follow.

This study emerged from my own lived experience. Struggles inherent in my personal identity development along with conversations with another on his personal developmental journey gave birth to this project and to the questions that lie beneath. Marcia (1980) describes identity as referring "to an existential position, to an inner organization of needs, abilities, and self-perceptions as well as to a sociopolitical stance" and to "a self-structure – an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organization of drives, abilities, beliefs, and individual history" (p. 159). He suggests that time away at college

provides a kind of "psychosocial moratorium" in which individuals may defer commitments to vocation, relationships, and so forth until some time in the future. So it is with graduate school.

I have had the privilege of being both a pastor and a graduate student in psychology while in graduate school. My life during this time has been a reflection of the tension between religion and psychology experienced by many, some of whom are cited in this study. My identity status has therefore been, in Marcia's terms, that of a Moratorium. Marcia (1980) suggests, "Moratoriums are individuals who are currently struggling with occupational and/or ideological issues; they are in an identity crisis (p. 161)." This locates, very aptly and succinctly, my place in the struggle to understand the relation between religion and psychology. For me, the question informing this study has been not only an ideological one, but also an occupational and personal one as well. The even more fundamental questions for me at this juncture in my life include, "How can psychology and religion reside peacefully and with integrity in my own heart and head?" "What will the marriage of psychology and religion look like in me vocationally?" Perhaps this whole endeavor has been my way of seeking encouragement from other voices on a similar journey and of asking for help in making sense of this relation from the lived experience of others.

To add Murray's insight to my location in this discussion, this "identity crisis" or Moratorium status, has been precipitated by both internal need and external press. I have experienced both a "need" and a "press" to arrive at an answer to the question posed by this project. For Murray (1938), a "need" refers to the important determinants of behavior that reside within an individual, while "press" refers to external, environmental

determinants that elicit behaviors from the individual. I have already alluded to my own need for internal peace and understanding and reconciliation between my systems of conviction. The "press" that I have experienced throughout graduate school, while serving as pastor and psychologist-in-training, is highlighted in all the practical threads that run throughout the literature review, the data analysis, and, most importantly, in my own lived experience. Questions about who I am to the client in therapy, how and whether to address religious issues in psychotherapy, when and whether to refer, how and with whom to collaborate and more have been raised as very immediate and concrete issues for me in my work as both pastor and therapist.

Our primary motivation, according to Murray, is tension reduction. My "need," therefore, has been to establish a sense of direction and an internal peace about how these constructs fit together, not just theoretically, but practically as well. Marcia terms this a move toward identity achievement, where vocational and ideological commitments are made and pursued. Similarly, Fowler (1981; 1996) describes a need for and a move toward "individuative-reflective faith" in which "...there must be an interruption of reliance on external sources of authority.... There must be a relocation of authority within the self" (1981, p. 179). Author and developmental psychologist Helen Bee describes this stage of faith development in a nice way:

> It is hard to convey just how profound a change this is. The metaphor I have found most helpful is one I have adapted from mythologist Joseph Campbell's writings (1986). It is as if in the stage of conventional faith we experience ourselves as like the moon, illuminated by reflected light. We are not ourselves the source of light (or knowledge) but are created by outside forces. In the stage

> of individuative faith we experience ourselves as like the sun, radiating light of our own. We are no longer defined by the groups to which we belong; rather we choose the groups, the relationships, based on our self-chosen beliefs or values. Thus, even if the specific beliefs we choose at this point are the same ones with which we have grown up, the underlying meaning system has changed. (p. 340)

Finally and fundamentally, I would describe my own faith identity as aligned with Fowler's "conjunctive faith" – a faith that is open to paradox, that moves away from fixed truth toward a search for balance, that embraces polarities, and myths, symbols, and stories – hence my current preference for fluency and familiarity with many ways of seeing and understanding experience. Changes in my life and my sense of vocational direction, however, have precipitated a reorienting process (identity crisis) to a prior stage of redefining myself apart from previous self-definitions. Both Marcia and Fowler, I believe, would describe this as movement inward to reorganize my sense of self and my stance toward life and faith and others.

It would be presumptuous of me to describe my research partner's perspective and the unique voice he brings to this conversation in the way that I have described my own. What I do know is that he has struggled, as I have, to reconcile the faith of his youth with the psychology of his experience. And what I propose is that all the voices in the conversation presented here are each on a dynamic journey of identity development and thus speak from their place in that journey. It is not my intention to review the variety of voices to the degree and in the depth that I have reviewed my own. That would be presumptuous too, as I do not have access to the personal histories and circumstances of each of the speakers in this conversation. However I will make inferences about some of

the voices, informed by my insights and those of the theorists I have mentioned, in the discussion of each of the categories and in a summary statement at the end of the discussion. To reiterate, I have addressed the question, "What is the relation between religion and psychology?" in the previous section by depicting the relations as they are portrayed by the 12 categories. In the ensuing discussion, therefore, theoretically informed inferences and interpretations will be made about variables (such as need and press) that inform the process of perspective taking and our place along the continuum as I have described it.

Category 1: The other is bad because it is harmful or destructive.

As indicated in Figure 1, voices that identify with one construct in this category represent the other construct in a negative, even adversarial light. Not only is the alternate construct represented in a negative fashion, but also the construct with which the speaker identifies is often described in an equally positive light.

This depiction of polarities with opposing valences suggests a felt sense of threat (press) on the part of the purveyors of the "positive" construct and a consequent rigidity, exclusivity, and hostility toward the construct that is threatening. This kind of dichotomous thinking – in black and white as well as in valences of positive and negative – is encouraged in warfare, in which the "others" are depicted as evil and are consistently portrayed as inherently bad, wrong, threatening and potentially harmful. Indeed, one meaning unit suggests that, "...for good people to do evil—that takes religion" (131). Others depict, "secular beliefs/practices as misguided, immature, wrong."

What service does this process of attaching a negative valence to the other provide to would-be warriors in the service of one particular truth? Perhaps it reduces the

tension that might result from considering the value of what (whom) one is about to dismiss, eliminate, and eradicate. In Murray's (1938) terms, it reduces the tension provoked by the external press to come to terms with this "other" construct that threatens the coherence and the cohesion of the chosen construct. Associating the other with a negative valence helps to make the dismissal palatable, easier, less value laden, a less valent personal struggle. It also enables the individual to abdicate the complexity involved in thinking for oneself, as it allows for identification with a particular group and the ideology of that group, which then becomes the external authority and arbiter for the individual's truth.

Marcia (1994) describes the Foreclosure identity status as the most adaptive status for those who find themselves in a context that stresses "communal values as necessary for the survival of the group" (p. 71). He also describes those who give in to the temptation to foreclose on truth and identity as argumentatively warding off opinions discrepant from their own and as evidencing an identity conferred upon them by an external authority, such as identification with a particular group. Similarly, Fowler's (1981) notion of synthetic conventional faith is that of one rooted in the notion that authority is to be found outside oneself (e.g., in a group or a set of beliefs).

It is possible that the negative valence associated with the other construct is a very real acknowledgement that both religion and psychology have caused harm to others. Viewing the other in an exclusively negative light, however, may be more reflective of a need for clarity and simplicity in the face of ambiguity and struggle. It does not seem unfair to suggest that perhaps the apparent rigidity, defensiveness, and hostility represented in the voices of this category may indicate a sense of external threat. The

voices that ascribe to the eradication of the "other" are therefore choosing to eliminate the threat rather than to wrestle and to struggle with it and the meaning it has to offer.

Category 2: There is only one, "true" way and no need for the other.

In this category, only one construct is allowed in the realm of praxis and theory. The other remains unheard, unacknowledged (except dismissively), and, literally, boxed out. Similar to the voices in the previous category, the meaning units in this category speak of an allegiance to one of the constructs and advocate dismissal of the other. There is, yet again, an insistence on one road to truth (conceptually) and to the methods attendant to that truth. A memo note asks the question, "Identity foreclosure? – stubbornly insistent early on?"

Many of the voices in this category, like those in the previous category, have a strident, rigid, defensive feel to them. Phrases such as "scientific work is the only road," "science as I define it," "religion is sufficient" sound threatened and closed to other roads to reality, to truth, to healing and wholeness. This defensive posture and appeal to external authority (e.g., the methods of science alone or the practices of religion alone) appear inconsistent with the flexibility Marcia (1980) describes in the Identity Achievement status, wherein the ego is well developed and the individual is nondefensive as a result. They are also inconsistent with the openness and outward orientation toward other viewpoints and roads to reality that Fowler describes in those with well-developed faith.

Hence, perhaps it might be said that in relation to some press from the environment individuals in this category have foreclosed on exploring other avenues of insight and helpfulness, again, in the name of tension reduction. The result is a fairly

rigid and closed alignment with one set of ontological convictions and epistemological methods. Again, this is simply one way of making sense of the positions represented here.

Category 3: One subsumes or informs the other.

Some have taken the position that either psychology or religion is primary. In this category, one of the constructs is more fundamental than the other or serves as a lens in organizing information about the other. One voice in this category declares that, "Faith equals behavior resulting from contingencies." Another claims that, "Virtually all problems are religious at their source."

One memo note from the examination of the relation of the constructs in this category alludes to the covering category, wondering, "cover – a shield from uncertainty? sin? mental illness?" It seems that there is some level of pressure reflected here to ward off something (complexity, ambiguity, identity crisis, disequilibrium?) and to assimilate aspects of thought and experience into one interpretive system, one system of meaning, so to speak. This tension is resolved here by explaining one construct in the language and symbols of the other. "Faith" is simply about reinforced contingencies and nothing more. Psychology and psychotherapy are really about the task of resolving issues that are fundamentally religious in nature.

Bee (1996) rightly notes that:

> In talking about stages of faith development, James Fowler (1981, 1983) goes beyond questions of moral reasoning to search for the emergence of each individual's worldview, or model of her relationship to others and to the universe. He uses the word faith to describe such a personal model... Fowler's model might

> be called a theory of the development of meaning systems....In Fowler's view, each of us has a faith, whether or not we belong to any particular church or organization....Faith...is a set of assumptions or understandings...about the nature of our connections with others and with the world in which we live. At any point in our lives, he argues, each of us has a 'master story,' which is 'the answer you give to the questions of what life is about, or who's really in charge here, or how do I live to make my life a worthy, good one. It's a stance you take toward life' (Fowler, 1983, p. 60). (Bee, 1996, p. 339)

Faith, for the individual voices reflected in this category, appears to be a belief in one system of explanations or at least in the fundamental priority of one system of beliefs. Tension is therefore reduced in this category by explaining one system as prior to or reducing to the other.

Category 4: I did not know there was a problem.

In this category, the boundaries of the constructs are diffuse and fuzzy, reflecting the chorus of apparent confusion, disinterest, absence of awareness and perhaps abdication of the struggle to make sense of the boundaries and the relation between psychology and religion. Memo notes indicate some musings about what might underlie this absence of struggle with the question at hand. One note simply lists possibilities such as, "naiveté, cognitive laziness, willful submission (to external authorities)." Another simply states, "Apathy? Indifference?"

One commonality between the meaning units in this category is the apparent absence of need or press to clarify the boundaries of these constructs or the relation between them. As another memo note suggests, the voices in this category seem to

reflect a "pretheoretical" position on the issue. They either have not thought much about it for lack of interest and press or they have decided, "I can't make this work," to quote another memo note and have thus abdicated the struggle. Some may simply have decided to live with conceptual and clinical confusion.

Marcia (1994) suggests that those whose status is represented by Identity Diffusion are persons "who lack strong commitments" (p. 71). Their perspective may well reflect a lack of ego development and cognitive complexity. With regard to the meaning unit, "Unfortunately, all too often either a priest or a therapist presumes to a competence he does not have and should not be expected to have, or assimilates what he sees to his own specialty," it might be suggested that,

> ...potential disequilibration of existing structures puts one into the position of either closing one's psychological eyes to the new issues and avoiding the discomfort inherent in modifying existing structures (i.e., one assimilates) or enduring that discomfort and changing the internal structure (one accommodates). As psychotherapists know, no one likes to change. Most people just want to feel better. (p. 66)

We might interpret, then, this lack of felt need or press to address the relation between the constructs as turning a blind eye, so to speak, to the problem. (Or, for those, like myself, with a Moratorium Identity status, perhaps the lack of felt need or press to take a position is indicative of the developmental process and the reorganizing of the self and the stance toward others that a moratorium allows.) Fowler (1996) calls this lack of struggle and reflection "synthetic conventional faith," which he describes as "a personal and largely unreflective synthesis of beliefs and values" (p. 170).

Similarly the appeal to external authority in the meaning unit, "Why should I question the 'great men of science' who saw no conflict?" could be described as foreclosure (Marcia 1980; 1994) in the service of tension reduction (to use Murray's terminology). These positions, then, may reflect the identity statuses Marcia describes as Identity Diffusion (persons who lack strong convictions and commitments) and Foreclosure (persons who look to external authority, such as 'the great men of science,' for self-definition and upon whom identity is therefore "conferred"). (It may also be said that the relation of these constructs is simply not of interest to persons whose identity and concomitant beliefs and individual histories do not encourage attention to one of these constructs.)

In summary, in this category there is an apparent lack of press or felt need to address the relation between these constructs. The aforementioned are simply some of the possible explanations for this and for those who find their voices landing here.

Category 5: They are separate and equally valid.

This category of meaning units characterizes both constructs in a positive light. Both are potentially useful as they make contributions from their differing areas of expertise. Both categories, however, remain distinct and, according to the voices in this category, in the words of a memo note, "there should not be any overlap. There is an intentional exclusion both across people and within people. This category allows for both."

In this category, then, the constructs live on equal footing but are relegated to their own distinct contexts. Across people, conceptually this looks like "psychology can't do religion" and "Science and religion involve different epistemic assumptions and

methods" but "There is a place for both...." Clinically, this looks like referrals from one profession to the other, since psychologists can only do psychology and religionists can only deal with religious issues. A memo note exclaims, "If only they were that discrete!"

Within a person, this characterization of the relation between the constructs looks very much like compartmentalization. What this would mean for me, for example, is that in my role as a pastor I would take advantage of religious symbols, address religious issues, and speak using religious language. I would not do so if I were acting in my capacity as psychologist or psychotherapist. In this context, I would address psychological problems, invoke psychological explanations and concepts, and suspend my religious precepts and resources.

This is how many have decided to the reduce the tension associated with valuing two apparently disparate systems of meaning, rather like keeping two prized pets fenced in separate locations. One can visit and enjoy companionship in the presence one and then close the gate and move into the space of the other. This works as long as the fence holds up. When it no longer holds, a crisis is brewing of the kind that is a harbinger of both danger and opportunity – the danger of the dissolution of one orientation toward life and meaning and the opportunity to revise and revision and restructure. In the words of our theorists such an event might precipitate a crisis of faith or an identity crisis but hold the promise of possible consolidation and increased ego strength and a renewed and revised perspective on life.

Category 6: We are obligated to be respectful.

As noted in the results section of this document, what was clear and notable and common to the voices in this category was the ethical mandate through which interaction

between the constructs is filtered. Memo notes from examination of this category describe the, "grudging, dutiful, obligatory acknowledgement of the other" exemplified in this group of meaning units and the fact that, though there is interaction between the two constructs, it is "not coming from within." This category "implies externally driven relinquishment of boundaries" and the presence of a "third party mediator" between the two constructs. The tenor of this category sounds much like the voice of a parent telling two children "You two need to work this out!"

While parental values and mandates can be internalized, as can ethics codes and religious commandments, it is one thing to live them and another to invoke them (with words such like should and must and obligated) or to respond, as Murray might put it, to the press of a mandate. There remains, in the voices in this category, the sense that identity as an ethical person is imposed or conferred upon an individual from his or her tradition of choice. Marcia (1994) suggests that, "In any case, both conferred and constructed identities are preferable to identity diffusion. Having some identity is preferable to having none" (p. 65). A constructed identity, however, in which the individual has worked through and claimed an orientation as her or his own is preferable to a conferred identity, which is adopted from an external source. Marcia declares, "My view is that a constructed identity is preferable to a conferred one because of the increased ego strength and flexibility that it yields" (p. 65).

Fowler describes the final stage in faith development as the living out, the "incarnation" or "fleshing out," of principles and imperatives. Bee (1996) describes Fowler's final stage of faith development in this way, "In the stage of universalizing faith the individual lives the principles, the imperatives, of absolute love and justice" (p. 341).

This fleshing out of principles and imperatives has an entirely different feel to it than the obedience and obligation described by the voices in this category.

Category 7: We must come to terms with one another.

The external press in this category is what I came to term "the greater good." The territories continue to remain separate and external structures are still demanding interaction, even integration, between the two, but the external demand in this particular category is not identified with either of the two traditions.

The alleviation of human suffering, the treatment, the salvation and the healing of others, all of these demand that the purveyors of each of the constructs set aside their differences and work together. As one meaning unit says, the "...artificial distinctions of separate territories, roles, and power bases dissolve in the sweaty struggle in behalf of the bests interests of the patient." Another asserts, "Healing demands interaction and integration."

Memo notes for this category indicate the recognition that the, "demand characteristics of these items are external to either and are located in the demands of scientific progress, philosophical structure, client well being" and so forth. Another acknowledges the different criteria of the conceptual and the methodological subcategories by indicating that one describes, "the demands of inquiry and sense making" while the other depicts, "the demands of the client or the parishioner." Another makes an apt analogy to the demands inherent in this category describing the mandate in this instance, "like branches of the armed service that squabble in peace times and pull together during conflict."

This analogy is a good one, as it dovetails with my growing awareness that "therapist desire is beginning to emerge here." There is an indication of an inner need or desire to push beyond squabbles between the constructs and beyond even oneself for the benefit of the greater good, however that good might be defined. Fowler (1996) describes this gradual opening up to others in this way:

> From the nondifferentiation of self and objects in the earliest phases of infancy to the naïve egocentrism of the intuitive-projective stage, each successive stage marks a steady widening in social perspective taking. Gradually the circle of 'those who count' in faith, meaning making, and justice has expanded until at the conjunctive stage, it extends well beyond the bounds of social class, nation, race, gender, ideological affinity, and religious tradition. (p. 175)

The desire to help another, to do the right thing, to reach beyond oneself and one's personal tradition seems to begin to emerge in this category where working together is valued on behalf of what can be accomplished through cooperation.

Category 8: Something is lost if we do not try to bridge the two.

The notion voiced in this category is that if one construct does not attend to the other, in some way build a bridge to the other, then some type of harm may be done to the other construct (and, presumably to the purveyors of this other construct). Words like "devalue" and "doing violence to" and insensitivity to, and "pathologize" reflect the type of harm cautioned against in this group of meaning units. Interestingly, the harm and the violence described here is the result not necessarily of aggression of one against the other, but also of neglect – of one construct ignoring another or being ignorant and unaware of the other or simply not considering the alternate construct and its' attending

implications for others. (Hence the depiction in Figure 8 of one construct sitting atop another can be construed, rightfully, as one sitting blithely and unaware upon another or as one rolling over and flattening the other.)

One meaning unit in this category suggests that, "...to ignore a social phenomenon as widespread as religion and spirituality is, in essence, to devalue a significant part of cultural life and ethical experience." One memo note reads, simply, "gag order," and another, "disempowered groups." As therapists and as religionists, we do violence to others if we do not honor and help to articulate their experience. If we ignore them, we invalidate their experience. Thus, if pastors ignore the physiological factors of mental illness, for example, they do violence to the parishioners who need medication and psychological help. If therapists neglect to address spiritual issues raised in therapy, such as the alienation some HIV sufferers experience from the religious traditions in which they have previously been loved and raised and nurtured, then they implicitly invalidate the client's experience and ignore the client's offering of personal experience and pain that has been extended to the therapist.

One memo note indicates that these meaning units were "really hard to find in professional literature in both camps." Perhaps this is a small voice in the conversation. Or perhaps those who desire collaboration and bridge building between the constructs are more prone to exhortation than to prophecies of doom. Regardless of the reason, it should be noted that the voices in this category were few.

Category 9: The other is worth paying attention to.

As noted in the discussion of results, one memo note for this category emphasizes the positive value that appears to be placed on "the process of perspective taking" from

the viewpoint expressed here. A meaning unit suggests that, "Religions are more than moral codes or methods of seeking life after death. They reflect values worth exploring." Another asserts that, "the psychologically healthy are more religious and engage in more religious activities," suggesting that there is something here worth investigating.

Again, in this category there is an emerging sense of felt need to pay attention to the other – an increasingly inclusive and open stance toward the other. This increasing openness to the other is reminiscent of the process of ego identity development described by Marcia (1980). He states that,

> A well-developed identity structure, like a well-developed superego, is flexible. It is open to changes in society and to changes in relationships. This openness assures numerous reorganizations of identity contents throughout the "identity achieved" person's life, although the essential identity process remains the same, growing stronger through each crisis. (p. 160)

For Marcia then, an opening up, and a kind of "looking around" with curiosity is indicative of a growing ego strength, which can tolerate opening up to others.

Fowler (1996) also suggests that faith development involves a "process of decentration from the self that proceeds through the sequence of stages" with each successive stage marking a "widening in social perspective taking" (p. 175). This opening up to the value of paying attention to other points of view, for Fowler, may be an indication that the seed of conjunctive faith is beginning to grow.

Category 10: We win if we build bridges.

Whereas the previous category emphasized the positive nature of attending to the other construct, the meaning units in this category take this perspective one step further.

They speak more specifically to the positive nature of the other enterprise as well as to the potential benefits of bridging the two. One meaning unit even states that, conceptually, the two constructs are complementary, implying that they are both necessary.

Clinically, the voices located here call for specific types of interaction between these two constructs. One declares, "Ideally, religious communities and psychologists will collaborate to enhance personality change and adjustment...." Others call for integration of the two or for conversation, media presentations, and Web-based resources -- all forms of cooperative interaction between the two.

The "reasons for bringing the two together," or the possible benefits of bridging the constructs, include enhancing "personality change and adjustment," "increased learning opportunities," "health benefits," and more sensitive assessment and treatment. Memo notes from examination of this category add, "People get better if!" People get better if the people behind the constructs collaborate, work together, and complement rather than compete with one another, for example.

Memo notes also indicate an "increasing internal need and ability to pull this off," suggesting a growing recognition of and desire for the positive changes inherent in the process of working together. Here I must acknowledge that the large number of meaning units (listed in Table 1) singing this refrain does not necessarily signify that the majority of voices are espousing this position. Indeed, it may represent an outgrowth of my own voice more than it represents the number of others who are of the same perspective. It may also reflect the accessibility of this viewpoint in the literature and the current wave of research and literature around the topic of interest.

All this being said, it seems that in the categories as I have ordered them, this grouping of meaning units is, by far, more driven by internal needs than the previous categories. It also seems that there is more positive emotional valence and investment revealed in the voices here than in preceding categories. Meaning units such as, "A conversation between popular Christian writers and psychiatrists about the realities of severe depression would benefit both" and "Mental health would be enhanced in underserved areas by media presentations and Web-based resources involving both professions" also call for a greater balance between perspectives and practices.

> Here Fowler's depiction of conjunctive faith seems timely and relevant. He says, In the transition to the conjunctive stage one begins to make peace with the tension arising from the realization that truth must be approached from a number of different directions and angles of vision. Faith must learn to maintain the tensions between these multiple perspectives, refusing to collapse them in one direction or another.... Conjunctive faith exhibits a kind of epistemological humility. (1996, p. 174)

A mature faith, it seems, from this vantage point, allows one to open up to other perspectives with humility, curiosity, and interest.

Marcia (1994) says something that sounds quite similar about the ability to "look around" and enjoy other perspectives with the benefit of a well-developed ego structure. He says:

> A 'good' personality structure, or a 'good' self-theory, permits one to deal more efficiently with problems presented by the world. An identity structure functions on a perceptual level to select personally relevant stimuli, on an internal

> organizational level to fashion behaviors according to the individual's preferred style. What at one time one had to think about at length is now resolved more quickly because of the identity structure. Only after one has learned to drive can one begin to look at the scenery. The freedom to look around and explore, however, is the result of an efficient internal structure, whether cognitive...or social-interactional..., and permits one to see problems not apparent before the formation of the structure permitted such circumspection. In other words, the formation of an internal structure, such as an identity not only simplifies handling the world but also expands one's horizons, so that previously unseen issues now arise. (p. 66)

Again, there is an opening up of perspective with an increase in identity development and an opening up toward "new horizons" previously unseen.

These are nice metaphors for the opening up that seems to be taking place in the perspectives of our meaning units from an exclusive focus of one system of meaning to a vision of the potential and the possibility inherent in the intersection and integration of the constructs of interest.

Category 11: All is one. It is really the same stuff.

This category is well represented by the theoretical prototypical meaning unit originating from an Episcopal priest. As she studied the new discoveries of quantum physics, she had an intense experience as she realized the connection the principles of quantum physics had with her own life and the implication of these connections. She said,

> By calling this a religious experience, what I mean is that I experienced salvation in it. All those fractured parts of myself—the math part, the verbal part, the physical part, the spiritual part—they all came together that day. I felt like someone whose multiple personality disorder had been healed.

This chorus of voices sings the same refrain – there is no separate thing. All is one. We are all involved in the same enterprise. What one does affects another. The universe is an interconnected web. When one place is touched it radiates out and affects the far corner of the web. "The whole is the fundamental unity of reality." "In learning about human life, we will necessarily learn something about God."

Marcia (1980) says, "The identity process neither begins nor ends with adolescence. It begins with the self-object differentiation at infancy and reaches its final phase with the self-mankind integration at old age" (p. 160). The culmination of the identity development process is therefore, according to Marcia, a sense of integration (oneness) with all of humankind.

Fowler (1996) says it like this:

> People found in the universalizing stage are relatively rare.... Psychodynamically, the self in this universalizing stage moves beyond the usual forms of defensiveness and exhibits an openness that is based on groundedness in the being, love, and regard of God.... Similarly, the authentic spirituality of the universalizing stage avoids polarizing the world between the 'saved' and the 'damned.' Their approaches to personal and social reform are as concerned with the transformation of those they oppose as with the bringing about of justice and reform. (p. 176)

Category 12: Both are really about something else

This final category emerged late in the process, as mentioned in the discussion of results. Perhaps I was so engaged in the important task of examining the relation between psychology and religion that I failed to "hear" the voices suggesting that there might be something else more important to consider.

These voices share the perspective that both of the constructs are really about something else – about a third construct that does not live in either of the two camps but is larger than both. Some of the names given to this third thing include "faith," "mathematics," the "psyche," "what works," "reality," "postmodernist ways of seeing," "acceptance," "friendship," and "transcendence."

One memo note indicates that these meaning units seem "desireless and reductive." Another suggests that they hint of "Aristotelian final causes." Perhaps, in essence, they are the culminating category in their representation of psychology and religion as parts of a larger whole, moving together in the direction of something greater.

In summary, there is a sense in which the content and the ordering of the categories as I have suggested them reflects an ever widening, ever expanding perspective that moves toward inclusion of the other construct, valuing it, working with it, and moving beyond both of the constructs to a vision of something greater. This movement can be characterized as moving from antagonism to embracing, from exclusion to inclusion, from rigid defensiveness to flexibility and openness, from an focus inward on the self to an outward looking toward others.

Many of the early categories appear to be shaped by external press (Murray, 1938) and to define their positions in relation to external authority and pressure. Some of

the later categories, especially Category 10 and Category 11, seem to represent the emergence of an internal need or desire to come to terms with other sources of truth and meaning, with other methods of healing and bringing about positive change.

This increasing openness to other sources of truth and meaning is congruent with Marcia's (1980; 1994) characterization of ego identity development in the later stages. In the initial stages, the ego is fragile and so clings to external sources of identity and is more likely to reject information that threatens the integrity of the system or would somehow necessitate change in ideology, values, or vision. Foreclosure Identity and Diffuse Identity, as previously mentioned, are represented in the earlier categories, just as they represent early stages in the development of identity. Foreclosure Identity status is marked by defensiveness, certainty, and a closed system of convictions, such as those marked by categories 1 through 3 perhaps. Diffuse Identity may be characterized as an unreflective or confused set of ideas and convictions, such as some of those found in the category, "I didn't know there was a problem." By contrast, the nondefensive, curious, open, flexible, and yet responsible posture of Identity Achievement appears well represented in the later categories as I have ordered them.

Finally, with regard to how the continuum of categories "maps onto" Fowler's assertions about the stages of faith development, it seems clear to me that there is a progression of perspectives, as captured in the continuum of categories, that coincides with Fowler's description of faith development rather nicely (if not perfectly). Just as the stages of faith that Fowler describes move from a rather fixed system of convictions and an identification with external authority and sources of authority, so the earlier perspectives as depicted on the continuum of categories appear more inwardly focused

and simultaneously reliant on one set of ideas or one referent group (as external authority). As more literal, fixed, and unreflective forms of faith move gradually in the direction of reflection, critical examination, and openness to and interest in the welfare of others, so too do the categories seem to move. Indeed, Fowler (2000) seems to describe some of the voices in Category 10 well when he speaks of conjunctive faith. He says:

> Conjunctive faith combines deep, particular commitments with principled openness to the truths of other traditions. It combines loyalty to one's own primary communities of value and belief with loyalty to the reality of a community of communities. Persons of conjunctive faith are not likely to be 'true believers' in the sense of displaying an undialectical, single-minded, uncritical devotion to a cause or ideology. They will not be protagonists in holy wars. They know that the line between the righteous and the sinner goes through the heart of each of us and our communities, rather than between 'us' and 'them.' (p. 54)

In the same way, Category 11, "All is one," and Category 12, "Both are really about something else," involve the "decentration from the self" and the expansion in "perspective taking" that Fowler describes as indicators of universalizing faith. He distinguishes universalizing faith from conjunctive faith with the following words:

> From the paradoxical attachments and polar tensions of conjunctive faith, the Person best described as exhibiting universalizing faith has assented to a radical Decentration from the self as an epistemological and valuational reference point for construing the world and has begun to manifest the fruits of a powerful kind of kenosis, or emptying of the self. Often described as 'detachment' or 'disinterestedness,' the kenosis – literally, the 'pouring out,' or emptying, of

> self—described here is actually the result of having one's affections powerfully drawn beyond the finite centers of value and power in one's life that promise meaning and security. 'Perfect love casts out fear,' as it says in 1 John 4:18. The transvaluation of values and the relinquishing of perishable sources of power that are part of the movement toward universalizing faith are the fruit of a person's total and pervasive response in love and trust to the radical love of God. (p. 56)

Few persons live out the voice and the perspective found in Category 11 or in universalizing faith. And while this study has drawn primarily on Christian voices and sources, Fowler (2000) assures us all that universalizing faith "looks" the same in any tradition or culture, perhaps due to the very decentration and perspective taking that characterize it. He says:

> Universalizing faith, in its authentic form, is recognizable in any culture or tradition. Despite differences in the metaphysical convictions and imagery used to express them, and despite differences in their understandings of the relation of being and time, the quality of the lives of persons of universalizing faith from whatever time or tradition are demonstrably similar in spirit and in power. (p. 57)

In conclusion, I must acknowledge my own place on the continuum, as this is the place from which this whole project arose. My own voice, which, no doubt, has been evident throughout this work, is ever-changing and expanding. On the continuum of categories, for example, I am convinced that "All is one" – that we are all of us part of an interconnected web of life and that what one of us does affects another as surely as it affects ourselves. And yet, my sense of self, my faith, and my perspective on this issue is developing and growing. I would like to say that my voice is primarily located in

Category 11 and that I have the distance and detachment to pursue whatever is greater than either of these two constructs, like the voices represented in Category 12. My voice, however, lands more squarely and fully in Category 10 at the present time. As much as I would like to be free of "the paradoxical attachments and polar tensions of conjunctive faith" (Fowler, 2000, p. 56), I am afraid that, for now, I must ride the waves of my passion for psychology and my passionate faith to a larger shore. My hope is that I am moving in the direction of Identity Achievement, of responding to internal need rather than external press, of universalizing rather than conjunctive faith. Until then, I hold fast to the belief that "We win if we build bridges" because I suspect that "All is one" and that all of us will be better for listening to and reaching out to even one of us.

In conclusion, it is my hope that the insights from all of the participants in this project -- Murray, Marcia, Fowler, the voices represented in the categories as well as my own and my advisor's – have all been woven together in a way that offers something of value to the dialogue about and between psychology and religion. More importantly, perhaps, is this addition of my own voice to the chorus of others who have raised their voices to the issue at hand or who are now, also, searching for shouts of encouragement. May they, too, find some encouragement here.

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APPENDIX

Original Meaning Units for the Categorization Scheme of Perspectives on the Relation Between Religion and Psychology

Category 1: The other is bad because it is harmful or destructive.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(25b) "For example, in its crassest form, psychiatry views religion as neurotic, immature, or a solace for the mentally disturbed." (Larson, et al., 1986, p. 333)

(129) "...those of us grounded here, do seem prepared or disposed to construct belief systems to protect ourselves from direct encounters with reality. Perhaps it is because science has developed checks and methods to counter such self-deception that it is seen as a threat." (Peterson, TIPS, 1999)

(130) "They provided myths to answer real questions and myths were protected by untestability, threats, and promises....That is why they are still with us, and why millions of people's behaviour is routinely controlled by ideas that are either false or completely untestable." (Blackmore, as quoted by Ricker, TIPS, 1999)

(149) "In psychology (as well as many other academic disciplines), matters of religion and faith tend to be undervalued and often dismissed....The common attitude seems to be that no intelligent, thoughtful, modern, and scientifically minded person could ever believe in God or be religious in any way." (Plante, 1999, p. 541)

(162) "During this past century, behaviorism, pantheism, and evolution have ripped at the very foundation of biblical Christianity....With the most blatant of the new psychological systems, behaviorism, the human soul was totally denied and humanity was seen as just one more species of animal." (Couch, 1999, p. 134-135)

(112) "The person with a sacred consciousness, on the other hand, does not think of himself as the center of the universe. For him the center resides elsewhere, specifically in God—in the Sacred." (Peck, 1997, p. 244)

(111) "The individual with a secular consciousness essentially thinks that he is the center of the universe." (Peck, 1997, p. 244)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(3a) "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly" (Psalm 1:1, King James Version)

(3b) "...tenets of humanism...counsel based on such a foundation can be devastating." (Morris, 1999)

(140a) "One wrote, 'God offers hope. What does the psychologist offer?' Another queried, 'Why would someone seek advice from someone too dumb to accept salvation?' (Edwards, et al., 1999, p. 550)

(9) "The concept of sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbance. The sooner psychotherapists forthrightly begin to attack it the better their patients will be." (Ellis, 1961, p. 192)

(36) "...approach taken by some practitioners is eradication" (of religious beliefs). (Presley, 1992, p. 42)

(13) "I have not perceived the great majority of clergy as having adequate academic and clinical training or as having the ability to jump outside their religious world views in counseling clients." (Hendlin, p. 1989, p. 619)

(131) "With or without religion, good people can behave well and bad people can do evil; but for good people to do evil—that takes religion." (Weinberg, 1999)

(138) "Indeed, if we learn that someone is devoutly religious, or even tends in that direction, we look upon that person with puzzlement, often concluding the psychologist obviously had or has personal problems." (Sarason, 1992)

(140b) "Some psychologists also expressed disillusionment with the work of the clergy, perceiving that religious faith is presented as a panacea for all psychological distress. One rehabilitation psychologist observed that faith often extends denial and complicates treatment." (Edwards, et. al., 1999, P. 550)

(141) "Some psychotherapists have feared that the clergy were doing harm through failure to distinguish neurosis from spiritual discontent and through slowness to make referrals to experts. Concern for the possible usurpation of a role for which they were inadequately prepared has been based partly on a recognition that the older spiritual adviser had rarely received intensive instruction in scientific psychology or orientation to the nature of neurotic illness." (Schofield, 1964, p. 157)

Category 2: There is only one, "true" way and no need for the other.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(63) "...scientific work is the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves." (Freud, 1961, p. 31)

(88) "...people who attack science either directly...or indirectly...may be contributing unintentionally to an undermining of science...there are many

anti-science forces operative in society and the academy." (Clark, TIPS, 1999)

(87) "...some academics today will make (and believe)...I am not doubting people's sincerity) quite extreme statements to 'bring science down to size,' which has the net effect of diminishing any difference between science and whatever alternative is being defended or actively promoted (postmodernism, extremist qualitative methods, religion, indigenous ways of knowing, intuition...." (Clark, TIPS, 1999)

(82) "If we cannot see or measure something...then I believe what we should say is that we have no reason to believe that it exists" (Clark, TIPS, 1999).

(62) "...religious ideas...are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes...." (Freud, 1961, p. 30)

(61) "...our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere" (Freud, 1961, p. 56).

(12a) "Considerable effort was exerted in the development of psychology to distinguish it from its philosophical and pre-scientific beginnings, and the field has progressed as a result." (Ward, 1995, p. 543)

(132) "I am all in favor of a dialogue between science and religion, but not a constructive dialogue. One of the great achievements of science has been, if not to make it impossible for intelligent people to be religious, then at least to make it possible for them not to be religious. We should not retreat from this accomplishment." (Weinberg, 1999)

(163) "The alternative to the twentieth century humanistic worldview is Christ." (Noebel, 1999, p. 155)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(60) "Are any among you sick? ...The prayer of faith will save the sick, and the Lord will raise them up...." (James 5:14-15, New Revised Standard Version)

(7) "...the therapeutic programs of the future, whether under religious or secular auspices, will, like AA, take guilt, confession, and expiation seriously and will involve programs of *action*...." (Mowrer, 1961, p. 188)

(165) "...Jesus Christ is the Great Physician, and if we will but obtain new insights into the teachings of Christ, we will be able to deal with the core human problems in the late twentieth century, such as the need for wholeness, the need for healing and the need to overcome fear." (Blazer, 1998, p. 155)

(91) "...valid alternative to science...unsupportable attitude...."(Clark, TIPS, 1999)

Category 3: One subsumes or informs the other.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(4) "...biblical spiritual foundation...real psychology *is* biblical." (Maudlin, 1998, p. 32)
(32) "...a spiritually-informed psychology...." (Miller, 1992, p. 121)
(95) "Faith is a matter of strength of behavior resulting from contingencies which have not been analyzed" (Skinner, 1974, p. 147)
(41a) "..articulate a spiritual view of human nature and personality...." (Richards & Potts, 1995, p. 163)
(109) "In the end, all things point to God...." (Peck, 1997, p. 241)
(115) "...I've become more and more impressed by the frequency of statistically highly improbable event. In their very improbability, I gradually began to see the fingerprints of God." (Peck, 1997, p. 258)
(8) "...it is this Hell—the Hell of neurosis and psychosis—to which sin and expiated guilt lead us." (Mowrer, 1960, p. 186)
(161) "To paraphrase George Marsden, nonbelievers may hear all the notes of science, but without the theistic context and perspective, they will not hear the song." (Ratzsch, 2000, p. 159)
(164) "...the very 'being' of life involves theology, philosophy, ethics, biology, and so forth. It demands that we follow Christ in these areas...In psychology, Christ is 'Savior' of the soul (Luke 1:46-47)." (Noebel, 1999, p. 29)
(73) "...in the brain's temporal lobes there may be neural circuitry for religious experience...." (Talan, 1998, p. 9)
(76) "('neurobiology of faith')...the brain holds a peculiar place in the universe—and, more specifically, in *our* universe. We ourselves, in a sense, are brains. To study the brain is to study ourselves...." (Peterson, 1999, p. 84)
(74) (scientific findings) "don't invalidate religious experience. 'On the contrary," he says, "they tell us what parts of the brain may be involved." (Talan, 1998, p. 9)
(90) "What gets blurred, I think, is the difference between studying religion scientifically and promoting a religious perspective in psychology." (Clark, TIPS, 1999)
(99) "...psychic process of the child creating the internal representation of the sacred reality...." (Rizzuto, 1996, p. 413)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(41b) "...propose moral and spiritual frames of reference for therapy." (Richards & Potts, 1995, p. 163)
(1) "...in their deepest moments of self-comprehension and change, many clients see, feel, and act in spiritual terms. (Bergin & Jensen, 1990, p. 3)

(72) "...problem...of finding a religious outlook on life." (Jung, 1933, p. 229)

(55) "...the rabbi helps people deal with life's challenges and sufferings and teaches about life by faith...includes mental health." (Young & Griffith, 1989, p. 272)

(142) "Let us suppose that we turn first to a priest or minister. If he—or she or they...be of a fundamentalist persuasion, in all likelihood he will assure us that if we take Jesus (or whomever) into our hearts, the Lord will solve all our problems. Distinguishing between spiritual and psychological difficulties becomes unnecessary because in the end all are taken to be spiritual." (Shideler, 1983, p. 230)

Category 4: I did not know there was a problem

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(43) "...most priests an most therapists are conceptually confused." (Shideler, 1983, p. 231)

(79) "The great men of science...saw no conflict between science and religion." (Schmier, "Teaching In Psychology" e-mail listserv (hereafter identified as TIPS), 1999)

(157) "We can be religious, and we can be scientists. We will not use religious explanations in the science classroom; we will not hold spiritual beliefs to some type of concrete 'proof'." (Melucci, TIPS, 1999)

(158) "I find no conflict in demanding that in scientific inquiry we must have empirical data to make statements of 'finality,' while recognizing that religion is to a very large degree a matter of (sometimes irrational) faith." (Wildblood, TIPS, 1999)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(144) "Unfortunately, all to often either a priest or therapist presumes to a competence he does not have and should not be expected to have, or assimilates what he sees to his own specialty." (Shideler, 1983, p. 236)

(137) "I think I am safe in assuming that the bulk of the membership of the APA would, if asked, describe themselves as agnostic or atheistic. I am also safe in assuming that any one or all of the ingredients of the religious world view are of neither personal nor professional interest to most psychologists...." (Sarason, 1992)

(143) "Some simply revealed that they were unaware of either positive or negative collaboration taking place. Similarly, others reported a lack of time. Given the growing interest in connections between mental and spiritual health and the ubiquity of clients who request that their religious values be taken seriously..., both a lack of interest and a lack of time appear to be potential obstacles to high quality psychological care." (Edwards, et. al, 1999, p. 548)

(160) "Basic conflicts between value systems of clinical professionals, clients, and the public are dealt with unsystematically or not at all." (Bergin, 1980, p. 103)

Category 5: They are separate and equally valid.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(93a) "Science investigates; religion interprets. Science gives man knowledge which is power; religion gives man wisdom which is control. Science deals mainly with facts; religion deals mainly with values." (Martin Luther King, as quoted by Woolf, TIPS, 1999)

(11) "...science and religion are two distinct modes of knowing and explaining reality." (Aguinas & Aguinas, 1995, p. 542)

(6) "Psychology...is intended to provide knowledge about *human beings*, and that knowledge cannot be extended analogically to provide reliable, essential knowledge about God, and, hence, about the Christian religion." (Tjeltveit, 1989, p. 209)

(17b) "The substantive data of each other's disciplines represent different angles of vision for perceiving the care and cure of persons as human bodies." (Oates, 1978, p. 3)

(85) "...there is room for both science and religion." (Hetzel, TIPS, 1999)

(92) "I have always thought that science and religion are compatible. They have very little to do with each other." (Wildblood, TIPS, 1999)

(89) "Science and religion do not overlap." (Melucci, TIPS, 1999)

(100) "Representations are the *means* the mind has to know existing realities.... Thus, the God sought for by the sincere believer must not be confused with the representation of God. They belong to different layers of reality. The God representation is the means the mind has to seek God." (Rizzuto, 1996, p. 417)

(67) "It is as if there were in the human consciousness a *sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of* what we may call *'something there,'* more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed." (James, 1985, p. 58)

(133) "...there seems to be an irreducible mystery that science will not eliminate." (Weinberg, 1999)

(134) "Both institutions have much to protect, and yet an acceptance that neither can ever destroy the other, because their proper areas of influence are impregnable to the ideas of the other, might help to reduce their mutual scorn and fear." (Bunk, 1999)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(135) "Literally, science can never be religion, because it has no faith, which is belief without evidence. Science will always be a secular pursuit, replacing dogma with theories that enable falsifiable predictions. Any questions that cannot be subjected to these tools are not scientific." (Bunk, 1999)

(42) "In psychology we find that only those mental phenomena which are directly accessible to physical influences can be made the subject matter of experiment." (Wundt, 1977, p. 10)

(34) "...if a client raised a 'religious' question, we were not to address it but refer the client to the clergy instead...." (Mosak, 1987, p. 496)

(35) "One approach to dealing with religious issues raised by a client is to avoid them." (Presley, 1992, p. 40)

(136) "...counseling (in a secular university, anyway) is largely an amoral enterprise, and we can't fix problems of character." (Guinee, TIPS, 1999)

(5b) "...the therapeutic virtues are not only similar to the Christian ones; they are also, in important ways, quite different from them—even incompatible with them." (Roberts, 1994, p. 23)

Category 6: We are obligated to be respectful.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(14) "As psychologists, we have an ethical responsibility to understand differences among people...." (Conway, 1989, p. 627)

(144) "At a minimum, it is important to understand the client's religious belief system. Non-Catholics, as well as nonreligious psychologists, can be good candidates to work with Catholics, but they must respect and understand their beliefs without overpathologizing believers." (Plante, 1999, p. 544)

(150) "What is particularly relevant in Principle D is the call for psychologists to respect their clients' rights to 'privacy, confidentiality, self-determination, and autonomy' (APA, 1992, p. 1599). The challenge for psychologists may lie in respecting and promoting the autonomy and self-determination of religiously committed clients, especially if their values differ from those held by the psychologist." (Yarhouse & vanOrman, 1999, p. 560)

(154) "But I say to you that listen, Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you.... Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." (Luke 6:27, 28, 31, New Revised Standard Version)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(152) "Consultation requires a member of one profession to value what the other profession has to offer...." (Edwards, et al., 1999, p. 548)

(96) "Clinical training in professional psychology should include religion as one dimension or facet of human diversity." (Tan, 1996, p. 367)

(151) "Graduate, internship, and postdoctoral training programs should also include training in religious diversity as part of their multicultural sensitivity curriculum...." (Plante, 1999, p. 545)

(37a) "A third approach to dealing with religious issues is integration...religious issues are not only dealt with but are dealt with in such a way as to respect the client's right to choose or reject his or her faith." (Presley, 1992, p. 43)

(27b) "Though it may not be necessary for psychologists interested in collaborating with clergy to share these epistemological assumptions, they need to recognize and respect the basic worldview of clergy and parishioners." (McMinn, et al., 1998, p. 568)

(20) "...to be able to fully enter into a conversation, these beliefs must be addressed...when clients come to therapy, they need to feel heard and understood in order for change to take place." (Kudlac, 1991, p. 281)

(54a) "Collaborative therapies work within the core value structure of the client, moving therapy in directions consonant with the client's values." (Worthington, 1989, p. 591)

(19) "...if...the client sees God as a member of the problem-organized system, then God should be included in the conversation...." (Kudlac, 1991, p. 277)

(54b) "Arrogant therapies judge the client's values against an established standard." (Worthington, 1989, p. 591)

Category 7: We must come to terms with one another.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(17c) "Human suffering's demands overflow the banks of neatly separated roles." (Oates, 1978, p. 3)

(10) "The religionist must be willing to incorporate new scientific understanding into a flexible religious philosophy. The scientist must give up a narrow scientism to the enlarging perspective of spiritual reality." Cox, 1995, p. 541)

(16) "...there is a spiritual dimension of human experience with which the field of psychology must come to terms more assiduously." (Bergin, 1991, p. 401)

(103) "...every individual is born with spiritual needs and a longing for transcendent experiences." (Vaughan, et al., 1996, p. 497)

(107) "...religion ought to be one of those issues that *invariably is included* in all psychological treatment." (Shafranske & Malony, 1996, p. 562)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(17a) "...artificial distinctions of separate territories, roles, and power bases dissolve in the sweaty struggle in behalf of the best interests of the patient." (Oates, 1978, p. 3)

(2) "Neither psychiatry nor theology should minister alone. Healing is always on more than one level—the emotional, the spiritual, sometimes the physical." (McLean, 1999, p. 31)

(108) "I have become all things to all people, that I might by all means save some." (1 Corinthians 9:19-23, New Revised Standard Version)

Category 8: Something is lost if we do not try to bridge the two.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(56) "... ignore a social phenomenon as widespread as religion and spirituality is, in essence, to devalue a significant part of cultural life and ethical experience." (Weaver, et al., 1997, p. 473)

(139) "The human sciences cannot ignore or truncate this dimension of human activity, as they commonly do, without doing violence to the phenomena." (Richardson, 1996, p. 27)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(71) "If I recognize only naturalistic values, and explain everything in physical terms, I shall depreciate, hinder or even destroy the spiritual development of my patients. And if I hold exclusively to a spiritual interpretation, then I shall misunderstand and do violence to the natural man in his right to existence as a physical being." (Jung, 1933, 188-189)

(21) "...nonreligious therapists will ignore religious issues, will treat religious beliefs and experiences as pathological, will fail to comprehend religious language and concepts, will assume clients' values coincide or should coincide with theirs, and will recommend therapeutic steps considered inappropriate or unacceptable...." (Larson, et al., 1988, p. 1065)

(51) "...traditional mental health systems have tended to either ignore or pathologize clients' religious and spiritual concerns." (Smart & Smart, 1997, p. 396)

(18) "Counselors who ignore or avoid this essential dimension of human experience can miss opportunities for supporting and fostering psychological growth." (Hinterkopf, 1994, p. 165)

Category 9: The other is worth paying attention to.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(69) "...I attribute a positive value to all religions...their symbolism...their moral teachings.... I likewise attribute a positive value to biology, and to the empiricism of natural science in general, in which I see a herculean attempt to understand the human psyche by approaching it from the outer world." (Jung, 1933, pp. 119-120)

(27a) "...religious systems are much more than moral codes or methods of seeking life after death. At the heart of all major religions are epistemological values...." (McMinn, et al., 1998, p. 568)

(167) "Cooperation, mutual understanding and respect must develop between clergy and the psychological professions. Serious thought must be given by each to the factors that lead to a distorted view of sin and guilt and the degree to which this affects mental illness." (Curran, 1960, p. 194)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(25c) "...the psychologically healthy are more religious and engage in more religious activities." (Larson, et al., 1986, p. 333)

(23) "Religion is not a single measure of practices, beliefs, or attitudes, but a construct of multiple and interactive variables. (Larson, et al., 1986, p. 331.)

(24) "...why does psychiatric research so infrequently consider religious variables, and when it does, why is the methodology so inadequate?" (Larson, et al., 1986, p. 333)

Category 10: We win if we build bridges.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(40) "Much of the superstructure for a rapprochement of religious and secular psychotherapy is in place. Many ideological differences have been resolved, and a large proportion of the population desires it. What remains is for leaders to emerge and finally complete the bridge." (Quackenbos, et al., 1986, p. 85)

(93b) "The two are not rivals. They are complementary." (Martin Luther King, as quoted by Woolf, TIPS, 1999)

(153) "...with growing recognition for the extent to which the clergyman is turned to for help with emotional and mental problems, both the church and psychiatry are moving toward a rapprochement." (Schofield, 1964, p. 157).

(154) "The increased education of clergy in the field of mental illness should have a positive effect." (Schofield, 1964, p. 158)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(26) "Ideally, religious communities and psychologists will collaborate to enhance personality change and adjustment among parishioners with chronic mental health needs." (McMinn, et al., 1998, p. 565)

(114) "...only when we are able to integrate the attributes of faith and reason into our lives can we come closer to what constitutes integrity." (Peck, 1997, p. 256)

(127) "My own understanding is that, at least for many of us in the West, a spiritual practice is well complemented by a good psychotherapy. The two are not oppositional at all but can work together very well." (Eck, et al., 1991, p. 114)

(166) "A conversation between popular writers, such as LaHaye, and psychiatrists about the realities of severe depression could be beneficial to both." (Blazer, 1998, p. 159)

(22) "...clinician could probably learn much from the clergy...." (Larson, et al., 1988, p. 1068)

(153) "...culturally sensitive media presentations and Web-based resources that involve both professions have potential for enhancing mental health in underserved areas in the United States and internationally." (Edwards, et al., 1999, p. 550)

(159) "There is a great deal of research support indicating health benefits to spirituality and prayer." (Kyle, TIPS, 1999)

(101) "The main task of the therapist is to facilitate...process of becoming true to themselves and to their God." (Rizutto, 1996, p. 430)

(31) "Hopefully the bi-directional, co-professional model will encourage a more cooperative interaction between psychologists and clergy." (Meylink & Gorsuch, 1986, p. 62)

(138) "If the data of consciousness, our own inner experience, are granted validity equal to that accorded the data of sense, the externally verifiable, then this enterprise is empirical." (Helminiak, 1996, p. 16)

(53) "The psychologist informed about the possible involvement of religion in normative life transitions can more sensitively assess and treat...." (Worthington, 1989, p. 587)

(106) "...we are calling for an appreciation of the significance of religion in mental health and treatment..." (Shafranske & Malony, 1996, p. 562)

(70) "...necessity of rediscovering the life of the spirit.... It is the only way in which we can break the spell that binds us to the cycle of biological events." (Jung, 1933, p. 122)

Category 11: All is one. It is really the same stuff.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(57) "By calling this a religious experience, what I mean is that I experienced salvation in it. All those fractured parts of myself—the math part, the

verbal part, the physical part, the spiritual part—thy all came together that day. I felt like someone whose multiple-personality disorder had been healed." (Taylor, 1999, pp. 614-615)

(58) "Life on earth cannot be reduced to four sure-fire rules. It is an ever-unfolding mystery that defies precise prediction. Meanwhile, in this universe, there is no such thing as "parts." The whole is the fundamental unity of reality." (Taylor, 1999, p. 614)

(59) "There is one body and one Spirit...one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in all." (Ephesians 4:4-6, New Revised Standard Version)

(68) "To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold on upon religious realities." (James, 1985, p. 189)

(120) "Some modern scholars describe Buddhism not as a religion but as a science of mind, and there seem to be some grounds for this claim." (The Dalai Lama, 1991, p. 18)

(125) "...the reason we are not compassionate in a reality where we have abundance, where we have sensitivity, where we have each other, where we have interconnection with a miraculous web of beauty, generosity and so on, is that our ignorance makes us try to grab things for ourselves. Our basic ignorance makes us reject other people and fight—us against this vast thing—and think that we are somehow separate, which we are not. There is no separate thing, no independent, absolutely-established 'I' connected to the rest of the universe." (Eck, Gardner, Goleman, & Thurman, 1991, p. 108)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(28) "...I am not so sure that there is a distinct difference between clergy and counselor." (Mattson, 1994, p. 226)

(5a) "...therapeutic virtues are often similar to the Christian virtues...." (Roberts, 1994, p. 23)

(39) "...moderate religious viewpoint, then, is characterized as demonstrating a religious orientation rather than espousing one." (Quackenbos, et al., 1986, p. 84)

(77) "Furthermore, to study ourselves...is to study God.... That is, because we can experience God only as human beings...understanding the human brain can be the key to understanding God." (Peterson, 1999, p. 84)

Category 12: Both are really about something else.

A. Philosophical/Theoretical Level

(113) "The original relationship between religion and science was one of integration. And the integration had a name—philosophy." (Peck, 1997, p. 250)

(78) "In fact, both science and religion rest on faith...." (Schmier, TIPS, 1999)

(80) "The Creator's manuscript was Nature, and that manuscript was written in the language of mathematics." (Schmier, TIPS, 1999)

(122) "In the West, scientists have predominantly thought of reality as external to the human thought world, as the physical world, the outer world, the world 'out there'. It has seemed to scientists that the environment needed to be tamed, controlled and engineered to suit human needs. Thus physics, chemistry, biology and astronomy, armed with mathematics and geometry, have been considered the most important sciences in the West. The psyche was left to the priests, who eventually differentiated into philosophers, poets, artists and psychiatrists." (Thurman, 1991, p. 53)

(124) "This is the Buddhist scientific view. What it means is that every description of reality is conventional and none absolute, and that is why Buddhism can use materialism.... So this is what I mean when I say that Buddhism developed a variety of models of reality, of mind/body relationships, different ones useful for different purposes." (Thurman, 1991, p. 61)

(127) "Unfortunately, many scientists as well as many science-and-religion students, have viewed postmodern interpretations of science as inherently threatening. Indeed, I suspect that many scientists would say that if the rapprochement of science and religion demands a postmodernist view of science, then one can live without the rapprochement. Van Huyssteen urges against that fear. In a pluralistic world, he argues, everyone must take a more open stance toward all forms of knowledge, including science....Without such an open-minded perspective, science is in danger of replacing Christianity as the new engine of Western cultural imperialism." (Wertheim, 1999, p. 42)

(121) "In India, science and philosophy have never split.... And within philosophy's sciences, the inner science, philosophy/psychology, has always been considered the king of all the sciences." (Thurman, 1991, p. 53.)

B. Methodological/Clinical Level

(46a) "Thus what matters most as the waves and billows pour over us is not so much whether we seek out a minister or priest or psychotherapist, as whether the one we choose to work with has at least formal access to the domain of transcendence...." (Shideler, 1983, p. 240)

(155) "This quality of 'acceptance' *in our culture at this time* is peculiarly restricted to the psychotherapeutic contract, but it is common to all such contracts. In this sense, psychotherapy provides a very special, perhaps ideal, form of friendship." (Schofield, 1964, p. 109)

(46b) "...what matters...(is) whether he is primarily a crusader or an emancipator. The crusader will direct his efforts toward replacing our previous errors with what he takes to be The Truth.... The emancipator will be concerned to remove whatever is preventing us from achieving what we want to achieve...." (Shideler, 1983, p. 240)

(167) "'Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion. The love of life, at any and every level of development, is the religious impulse.'" (Leuba, in James, 1985, p. 507)